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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between speech and action is one of the most 
complex in the law of communications. Assumptions about the relationship 
pervade any number of First Amendment doctrines, from the secondary 
effects doctrine,1 to the fighting words doctrine,2 to the “true threat” 
doctrine,3 helping to explain why many speech-related crimes (for 
example, conspiracy, threats, fraud, and contempt of court) are not 
ordinarily thought even to raise First Amendment issues.4 
In his new book, Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the 
Way for Harmful Social Movements, 5 Alexander Tsesis sets forth a thesis 
about the relationship between what he refers to as “hate speech”6 and 
action that follows from it. His broad claim about the relationship is simple 
and straightforward: When systematically developed over long periods of 
time, “hate speech” lays the foundation for harmful social movements that 
ultimately result in the oppression and persecution of “outgroups.” From 
 
 1. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that zoning 
ordinances designed to combat the undesirable “secondary effects” of adult-entertainment 
establishments are content-neutral regulations subject only to intermediate scrutiny and 
survive First Amendment scrutiny). 
 2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that so-called 
“fighting words” fall outside the ambit of constitutionally protected speech); see also 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a bias-motivated crime ordinance as 
content based notwithstanding the fact that the ordinance was limited to “fighting words”). 
 3. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (stating that a law 
that criminalized threats against the president was “constitutional on its face”). Compare 
also Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 748, 751 (Va. 2001) (Hassell, J., dissenting), 
cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2288 (2002), with id. at 747 (Kinser, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the same statute is unconstitutional because “there is a difference between threat and 
intimidation and . . . intimidation may occur without threats” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 4. I say “ordinarily” because it is of course the exceptions that prove the rule. See, e.g., 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing a so-called “breach of the peace” 
conviction against a defendant who wore a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft”). The 
literature on this question broadly speaking is extensive. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, 
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989). 
 5. ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY 
FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002) [hereinafter TSESIS]. The book is an expansion of 
one of the author’s law review articles: Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of 
First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 
40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729 (2000). 
 6. I will use the phrase “hate speech” in the introduction, as it is the one he uses. I will, 
however, include quotation marks around the phrase because, as I describe in greater detail 
below, Tsesis himself uses the phrase “hate speech” in different ways depending on the 
context. In some places in the book, his notion of “hate speech” includes Chaucer, 
Shakespeare, and Dickens. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 111. However, his explicit definition of it 
is somewhat different. Id. at 207. This ambiguity is a problem for a number of reasons that I 
discuss in detail below in Part II. 
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this premise, he argues that United States courts should abandon the rule 
that advocacy or incitement must be likely to result in imminent harm 
before it can be constitutionally proscribed,7 and that legislatures should 
criminalize “hate speech.” He then concludes the book with a proposed 
statute to do just that. 
The book is composed of three parts. In the first part, Tsesis coins the 
phrase “misethnicity” to describe “hatred toward groups because of their 
racial, historic, cultural, or linguistic characteristics.”8 He then devotes the 
bulk of the first part of the book to three historical case studies: the 
Holocaust, slavery in the United States, and the U.S. nineteenth-century 
policy of Native American removal. He argues that, in each instance, “hate 
speech” laid the groundwork for the oppression that followed. After these 
historical examples, he then discusses contemporary society in two 
countries, Mauritania and the United States, and argues that “hate speech” 
continues to cause trouble in both places. 
In the second part of the book, Tsesis argues that, because of the 
social psychology of scapegoating, “hate speech” can draw upon herd 
mentality in a way that leads to persecution of “outgroups.” Like the 
historical examples he gives in the first part of the book, this part is meant 
to show that “hate speech” leads to, or in some sense causes,9 harm beyond 
those instances when there is an “imminent” threat of harm. 
The final part of the book is entitled “Legal Response to Hate 
Speech.” In it, Tsesis relies on his historical claims to critique current 
Supreme Court doctrine: 
Current Supreme Court hate speech doctrine fails to take into account 
the long-term social dangers of hate propaganda. The need for 
reconsidering that doctrine emerges after our sociohistorical survey of 
how, at various times, utterances and ideology gradually raised the 
pitch of hatred until they instigated grand-scale tragedies such as the 
Holocaust, Native American dislocation, and black slavery.10 
He then explains that much of the rest of the world criminalizes “hate 
speech” in some form and concludes that the United States should do the 
same. At the end of the book, Tsesis proposes a model statute to 
criminalize “hate speech.” 
At one level, the book’s thesis is simply one in a long line of 
arguments about the need to regulate racist speech.11 Indeed, at times 
 
 7. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 8. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 81. I will use the term, as it covers ideologies that do not fit 
literally into the term “racism.” 
 9. I discuss Tsesis’s claim of causation in great detail below. See Part III.B. 
 10. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 130. 
 11. The American legal literature includes a number of different arguments in favor of 
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Tsesis relies upon and restates many of these arguments.12 Yet on another 
level, it is fundamentally different from much American literature on “hate 
speech” because Tsesis draws on such a broad historical swath, and 
because he contends that the United States should regulate “hate speech” 
due to a causal link between that speech and oppression of such magnitude 
as the Holocaust and slavery. Moreover, it is fundamentally different 
because Tsesis focuses on the ideology of racial inferiority and not where 
most proponents of regulating “hate speech” in the past have set their 
sights—epithets, or what one could term “verbal assaults.”13 
To American lawyers steeped in the modern First Amendment, 
Tsesis’s thesis is bold, indeed radical. It is, however, little more than an 
importation of the theoretical underpinnings of an approach to regulating 
racist ideologies that much of the rest of the world—Europe, in 
particular—has relied upon,14 and one that Americans will increasingly 
have to grapple with as changes in communication technologies impose 
pressure to harmonize laws regulating information and expression.15 
 
regulating racist speech, the most prominent of which are: 1) Racist speech is group 
defamation. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2358 (1989) (drawing on group libel and 
Beauharnais). 2) Racist speech causes significant emotional injury to specific individuals. 
Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982) (analogizing racist speech to dignitary 
torts, such as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress). 3) Racist speech 
silences those on its receiving end and thus undermines the marketplace of ideas. Charles R. 
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 431, 471-72 (arguing that racist speech “decreases the total amount of speech that 
reaches the market”). 4) Basic principles of equality require such regulation, independent of 
any concrete harms. R. George Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 MISS. C. 
L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1988) (referring to the “deontic” or intrinsic harm of racist speech); David 
Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 456 (1987) (noting 
argument that a “society committed to ideals of social and political . . . equality . . . must 
issue unequivocal expressions of solidarity with vulnerable minority groups”). See generally 
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 267, 271-78 (1991); JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE 
RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 127-35 (1999). 
 12. See, e.g., TSESIS, supra note 5, at 100 (“Ethnic and racial insults are defamatory 
statements against individuals based on their membership in identifiable groups.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2332. 
 14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, art. 20(2), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 211, 
218-20 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). See Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2341-48. 
 15. For Americans, one recent example of this harmonization is the promulgation of the 
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
in 1998. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). Those provisions began as a domestic initiative in the 
United States. See WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
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Moreover, in a broader historical sense, it is Brandenburg,16 not Tsesis’s 
argument, that is revolutionary; the notion that speech can cause long-term 
harm and that it should be suppressed to avoid those harms has been around 
at least since Plato argued that the poets should be banned from the 
Republic because they corrupted the youth.17 
While Tsesis has raised some interesting issues for Americans to 
think about and has done a service by asking Americans to better 
understand why much of the rest of the world regulates biased ideologies, 
his argument ultimately fails to provide a sufficiently convincing reason  
for either abandoning Brandenburg or adopting his proposed statute. 
In Part II, I discuss the different ways Tsesis uses the phrase “hate 
speech” and how this variety of definitions undermines the connection 
between his proposed statute and the long-term harms he describes. In Part 
III, I discuss the historical claims Tsesis makes, claims that form the 
premise of his argument. I argue that he has failed to engage major 
historiographical debates and that readers of his book should thus be 
skeptical of his claims. In Part III, I also discuss Tsesis’s methodological 
approach and suggest that a comparative analysis might more fruitfully 
uncover the role that “hate speech” plays in the concrete harms he 
describes. In Part IV, I turn to Tsesis’s proposal. In Part IV.A, I argue that 
because he has misunderstood one of the underlying bases of the imminent 
harm requirement in Brandenburg, he is unlikely to convince American 
courts to abandon the doctrine. Finally, in Part IV.B, I look closely at the 
language of the statute that Tsesis proposes, arguing that the proposed 
statute, as drafted, would criminalize core political speech, a problem that 
needs to be corrected even if one were to accept both his historical premise  
 
 
 
(1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/. They then eventually 
became domestic law only after they were written into the WIPO Copyright Treaties. See 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, tit. I (1998). Much 
of what has been driving this move toward harmonization is the assumption that the Internet 
is enabling what Michael Froomkin refers to as “regulatory arbitrage”—the ability “to 
choose to evade disliked domestic regulations by communicating/transacting under 
regulatory regimes with different rules.” A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of 
Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129, 142 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997). 
 16. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that advocacy or incitement must 
be likely to result in imminent harm before it may be constitutionally proscribed. 395 U.S. 
444 (1969). 
 17. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book 10, Ch. I (Paul Shorey trans., Harvard University 
Press 1956) (poetry “seems to be a corruption of the mind of all listeners who do not possess 
as an antidote a knowledge of its real nature”); id. at Ch. XVI. I am indebted to my 
colleague Len Kaplan for this point. 
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and the general idea that a criminal prohibition on “hate speech” is an 
appropriate response to the historical atrocities he describes in the first part 
of the book. 
II.  DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PHRASE  
“HATE SPEECH” 
Tsesis uses the phrase “hate speech” in a variety of different ways. 
His stated definition differs from his statutory definition, and more 
importantly, these two explicit definitions differ from the implied definition 
he uses to set forth the historical and psychological premises of the book. 
This fact fundamentally undermines his thesis. 
Let us look first at his stated definition. At the beginning of the book, 
Tsesis equates “hate speech” with three other phrases: “hate propaganda,” 
“destructive messages,” and “biased speech.” He defines “hate speech” as 
“antisocial oratory that is intended to incite persecution against people 
because of their race, color, religion, ethnic group, or nationality, and has a 
substantial likelihood of causing such harm.”18 He then goes on to say that 
“[t]his definition does not include verbal attacks against individuals who 
incidentally happen to be members of an outgroup.”19 Notice that there is 
no requirement of hatred in his definition of “hate speech,” and he 
specifically excludes “verbal attacks” (that is, epithets), which is likely 
what the phrase first evokes to most Americans and is certainly what most, 
if not all, other American scholars refer to when they use the phrase “hate 
speech.”20 This definition allows Tsesis to use the phrase “hate speech” to 
advocate for the suppression of what is in effect expressions of racist 
ideology.21 
At the end of the book, Tsesis proposes a statute for criminalizing 
“hate speech” based on his earlier definition. At this point, he alters the 
earlier definition in two ways. First, he creates certain limits on his original 
definition by including an “intent to promote destructive behavior” 
requirement and an affirmative defense for “statement[s] . . . uttered as an 
 
 18. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 211. 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
 20. See Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2354-56; see also Delgado, supra note 11, at 135; 
Robert J. Boeckmann & Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino, Understanding the Harm of Hate Crime, 
58 J. SOC. ISSUES 207, 209 (2002) (“Hate speech is any form of expression directed at 
objects of prejudice that perpetrators use to wound and denigrate its recipients.” (emphasis 
added)) . 
 21. Tsesis’s definition lends a certain irony to Henry Louis Gates’s description of the 
phrase “hate speech” as “ideology in spansule form.” Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: 
Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: 
HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 17, 17 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. et al. eds., 
1994). 
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expression of opinion on a neutral scientific, academic, or religious subject 
and/or . . . statement[s] . . . made to eliminate the incidence of hatred 
toward a historically persecuted group.”22 Second, he broadens the original 
definition: While his original definition is limited to “antisocial oratory that 
is intended to incite persecution,”23 his criminal definition covers 
“[a]nyone inciting others to discriminate, persecute, oppress, or commit 
any similar acts.”24 I address some of the problems with the language of 
his proposed criminal statute in Part IV.B. For now, the differences 
between these two definitions are immaterial. What I want to focus on is 
the inconsistency between these two explicit definitions and the implied 
one he uses in arguing that first, “hate speech” led to the Holocaust, 
American slavery, and the U.S. policy of expelling indigenous Americans 
from their land; and second, through the social psychology of scapegoating, 
“hate speech” “elicits emotional and motivational responses, thereby easing 
guilt about groupwide mistreatment and injustice.”25 
Consider some of the examples of racist ideology and propaganda that 
Tsesis says should be viewed as leading to the historical calamities he 
describes in the first part of the book. As part of the background that led to 
the Holocaust, Tsesis cites a German journalist who, in the 1870s, stated, 
“Today the social question is essentially the Jewish question. All other 
explanations of our economic troubles are fraudulent cover-ups.”26 Or, 
consider his reliance on Thomas Jefferson’s statement that blacks were 
“inferior to whites in the endowments both off [sic] body and mind. . . . 
This unfortunate difference of color, and perhaps of faculty is a powerful 
obstacle to the emancipation of these people.”27 Another example is 
Tsesis’s citation to President Andrew Jackson’s comments supporting the 
U.S. policy of expelling indigenous Americans from their land in the 
nineteenth century. Jackson relied on the imagery of natives as “hunters 
and gatherers,” asking rhetorically, “[I]s it to be supposed that the 
wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, 
civilized Christian?”28 
These are just a few of the utterances that, according to Tsesis, led to 
the Holocaust, American slavery, and expulsion of indigenous Americans 
from their land. He is undoubtedly correct to characterize these claims as 
 
 22. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 207-08. 
 23. Id. at 211 (emphasis added). 
 24. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. Id. at 14 (quoting Otto von Glogau). 
 27. Id. at 35 (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. at 60. 
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misethnic ideology or biased speech. The question, though, is whether they 
constitute “hate speech” that he seeks to criminalize. In particular, would 
these statements satisfy his criminal definition?29 Would the person who 
made these statements be entitled to the benefit of his affirmative defense 
for statements “uttered as an expression of opinion on a neutral scientific, 
academic, or religious subject”?30 Were these statements “intended to 
incite persecution” or “intended to promote destructive behavior”?31 At no 
point does Tsesis explicitly address the question. Indeed, prior to giving the 
reader his proposed criminal statute, his concluding chapter lists a number 
of policy considerations, very carefully going through a number of “crucial 
issues that courts must analyze” to determine “[t]he significance of 
particular speech and its potential to lead to destructive behaviors.”32 And 
yet, it is unclear whether Tsesis wishes to criminalize the very speech he 
claims is so responsible for the historical harms he describes. 
If he would criminalize the statements mentioned above, the 
implications of his thesis go far beyond misethnic speech. If these 
statements fall outside the reach of his proposed statute, however, then his 
thesis is severely compromised. Tsesis claims that “hate speech” caused the 
Holocaust, American slavery, and Native American removal, and he 
proposes a statute to criminalize “hate speech.” And yet, the “hate speech”  
that caused the atrocities is not the same as the “hate speech” he would 
criminalize. By using the same phrase in different ways, he thus fails to 
notice this inconsistency in his argument. 
This problem becomes even more stark when we get to the “hate 
speech” he discusses in the second section of the book. Because this part of 
the book argues that “misethnic invective elicits emotional and 
motivational responses, thereby easing guilt about groupwide mistreatment 
and injustice,”33 his focus is on the degrading stereotypes that pervade 
society. Those stereotypes include, for example, “[j]okes targeting ethnic 
and racial groups”;34 hyperboles that “mockingly depict[] [minorities] with 
thick lips, big noses, and childlike behavior”;35 Chaucer’s portrayal of the 
“‘cursed Jews’ kidnapp[ing] and kill[ing] a Christian child” in The 
Canterbury Tales; Shakespeare’s portrayal of Shylock in The Merchant of 
 
 29. There is an obvious paradox here of hypothesizing the criminal prosecution of a 
president, which I will ignore for the moment. I address a related issue below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 137-46. 
 30. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 207. 
 31. Id. 
 32. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 202. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. Id. at 102. 
 35. Id. at 103. 
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Venice; and Dickens’s portrayal of “Fagin the Jew as a Satanlike  
creature.”36 
Tsesis writes, “The process paving the way to outrageous acts of 
injustice is, of course, gradual. It begins by indoctrinating children with the 
culture of racial and ethnic stratification.”37 This is undoubtedly true,38 but 
what are we to make of it in the context of a book advocating the 
criminalization of biased speech? Does Tsesis consider The Merchant of 
Venice “hate speech” or not? I doubt it, particularly given his proposed 
statute’s intent requirement. After all, if Chaucer, Shakespeare, and 
Dickens constitute proscribable “hate speech,” Tsesis’s argument amounts 
to the creation of a substantial police state,39 excising large chunks of our 
cultural heritage, not to mention popular culture. Modern-day book 
burnings would be trivial in comparison. If, however, his statute does not 
criminalize such works, he again appears to be undermining his own thesis 
by effectively demonstrating that the type of speech most likely to “pave[] 
the way for” atrocities such as the Holocaust and slavery are those that a 
ban on “hate speech” will not reach because they involve the “culture of 
racial and ethnic stratification.”40 
Another related problem surfaces from this divergence between 
Tsesis’s explicit definition of “hate speech” and the implicit one he uses to 
draw a connection between “hate speech” and harm.41 Recall that the 
explicit definition, both in its original form and in the proposed statute, 
includes an intent requirement.42 In some sense, this is perfectly 
understandable. As Tsesis recognizes, a criminal prohibition on speech 
 
 36. Id. at 111. 
 37. Id. at 106. 
 38. See JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY 
AND BLOODSHED 24-25 (1993) (“Even though verbalized in an apparently harmless joke or 
an innocuous television sitcom . . . stereotypes are often more pernicious than they might at 
first appear to be. Time and time again, they have been used to justify atrocities committed 
against members of stigmatized groups.”). 
 39. Cf. Gates, supra note 21, at 54-55 (criticizing Delgado, Matsuda, et al. for 
“signal[ing] a regime so heavily policed as to be incompatible with democracy”). 
 40. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 106. Indeed, given Tsesis’s example of anti-Semitism and 
the fact that he picks statements in isolation from their social context, it is surprising that 
Tsesis did not choose to indict the one book that has perhaps been used to justify anti-
Semitism more than any other—the New Testament. 
 41. I am indebted to my colleague Richard J. Ross for this insight. 
 42. The original definition is “antisocial oratory that is intended to incite 
persecution . . . .” TSESIS, supra note 5, at 211 n.1 (emphasis added). The proposed criminal 
statute specifically requires that the speaker “intend[] the message to promote destructive 
behavior.” Id. at 207 (emphasis added). In addition, his proposed statute also requires that it 
be “substantially probable or reasonably foreseeable . . . that [dissemination of the speech 
will] elicit” the discriminatory acts. Id. 
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would be unacceptable without such a requirement.43 But if it is the 
potential long-term harm of the speech at which Tsesis is aiming, why 
should intent matter at all? After all, the thrust of Tsesis’s argument is one 
of long-term cumulative effects—that is, that speech developed over long 
periods of time can cause harm—and over decades, even centuries, the 
effects of speech will almost certainly be inadvertent. There is thus a 
tension between the logic of Tsesis’s historical claim, which is rooted in a 
social science methodology of long-term, inadvertent, cumulative 
causation, and his proposed solution, which is based in the criminal law 
and must thus include an intent requirement.44 
In sum, the disconnection between the “hate speech” that causes the 
harms Tsesis describes in the book and the “hate speech” that he would 
criminalize undermines his thesis profoundly, even if one were to accept 
the premises and logic of his argument. I turn now to the historical premise 
of his thesis and address his proposal itself in Part IV. 
III.  HISTORY, CAUSATION, AND BIASED SPEECH 
A. Historiographical Debates About the Causes of the Holocaust 
and American Slavery 
Like the stories told by many lawyers, Tsesis’s history reads like a 
legal brief. Unfortunately, however, in order to convey a persuasive story 
when the facts are somewhat murky, Tsesis’s history simply ignores the 
contrary evidence in the record, a “record” that is, to say the least, vast. 
There are vigorous debates about the historical claims Tsesis makes. His 
are not simply claims that the Holocaust happened or that blacks were 
enslaved in the United States, claims that no serious historian disputes; 
 
 43. See id. at 203-04. The proposed statutory definition appears to have several 
different mens rea requirements: first, what appears to be a negligence standard with respect 
to the acts being incited (as opposed to the speech itself)—i.e., a requirement that those acts 
be “substantially probable or reasonably foreseeable”; and, second, the “[intent] to promote 
destructive behavior” prong, which Tsesis refers to as the “mens rea” requirement. See id. at 
203. Unfortunately, because the phrase “destructive behavior” has no definition, it is unclear 
whether the phrase “intend[ing] the message to promote destructive behavior” is the same as 
intending to “incit[e] others to discriminate, persecute, oppress, or commit any similar acts.” 
If not, the “intend[ing] the message to promote destructive behavior” language is simply a 
separate element of the crime, and there is strictly speaking no mens rea requirement for the 
actual incitement. I discuss the vagueness of the “inten[t] . . . to promote destructive 
behavior” language below. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55. 
 44. One could perhaps argue that his proposed statute would at least reduce the amount 
of biased speech, thereby reducing the probability of a future Holocaust. However, as I 
discuss below, Tsesis fails to show that a reduction in biased speech will reduce the 
likelihood of any atrocity. At best, all he shows is that a complete elimination of such 
speech would prevent such an atrocity. See infra Part III.B-C. 
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rather, his are claims about linkages and causation, claims that are hotly 
contested. And yet he writes as though there can be no doubt about the 
links between the expressions of racist and anti-Semitic ideology on the 
one hand and the resulting injustices on the other. For this Section of this 
Review, I do not intend to take sides in any of these historiographical 
debates, but wish simply to raise a few issues that Tsesis failed to 
consider—issues that raise serious doubt as to the credence we should give 
to Tsesis’s historical claims in assessing the strength of his ultimate thesis, 
that we should criminalize biased speech. 
Consider first his claim about the Holocaust. The following passage 
summarizes Tsesis’s view of the role of anti-Semitic ideology in the 
Holocaust: 
The German experience contradicts the view that only speech posing 
an immediate threat of harm is dangerous enough to warrant statutory 
censure. To the contrary, the most dangerous form of bigotry takes 
years to develop, until it becomes culturally acceptable first to libel, 
then to discriminate, and finally to persecute outgroups. The Nazis 
were able to accomplish what nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
anti-Semitic parties could not . . . only after extensive and prolonged 
racialist agitation. . . . Over time, misethnic religious and secular 
beliefs catalyzed a murderous ideology, supported by the majority of 
the German public. Early German ideology, which denounced Jews for 
not adopting Christianity, gave way to an even more combustible view 
that attributed to them an implacable and biological evil.45 
While Tsesis’s argument digs deep into the German past, drawing on 
anti-Semitic ideology as far back as the Middle Ages,46 he makes virtually 
no reference to the Versailles Treaty, the hyperinflation of the 1920s, the 
 
 45. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Perhaps the most telling example of Tsesis’s focus on expressions of anti-Semitic 
ideology as the “cause” of the Holocaust is the following passage: 
Hitler’s diabolical plan and its implementation [i.e. the Holocaust] should be 
compared with Luther’s ominous directives of how to deal with Jews. Take, for 
example, Luther’s advocacy of the burning of synagogues; nearly four hundred 
years after his pronouncement, when ancient anti-Jewish sentiments were at their 
apex, the Nazis and their sympathizers did just that [referring to Kristallnacht]. 
Id. at 25. 
Comparing “Hitler’s diabolical plan and its implementation” to a book written by Luther 
400 years earlier demonstrates a confusion between speech and action. There is simply no 
comparison whatsoever between the words Luther used in his book and the “implementation 
[of Hitler’s diabolical plan],” which consisted of the actual systematic killing of six million 
Jews by a secular, immoral regime. I doubt that Tsesis really believes that Luther’s words 
should be compared with the Nazis’ actions, as such an argument would be open to serious 
problems. Cf. Gates, supra note 21, at 53-54 (criticizing proponents of hate speech 
regulations for conflating racism with the expression of racism). What he is pretty clearly 
saying, however, is that society should criminalize words because of the possibility that they 
could have an impact, even if that impact occurs as much as 400 years later. 
DESAIFINAL 4/3/2003  2:00 PM 
364 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55 
mass carnage and traumatic impact of Germany’s defeat in World War I, 
the strength of the Social Democratic Party prior to the Third Reich, the 
special role of Austrians in both the formulation and the implementation of 
the Holocaust,47 the fear of communism in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution, or any number of other social and economic factors that are 
commonly considered to have contributed to the Holocaust.48 While “[n]o 
serious German historian discounts the legacy of German anti-Semitism,”49 
Tsesis makes a number of highly contested claims without acknowledging 
the disagreement among historians. As one scholar put it, “Historians, 
motivated by the conviction that racial hatred alone is not enough to 
explain the murder of six million human beings, have spent decades 
studying a whole set of causes that resulted in the extermination of 
Europe’s Jews.”50 
Tsesis’s failure to grapple with this historiographical debate affects 
both minor and fundamental parts of his thesis. Take for example his claim 
that “National Socialists had advocated [the Final Solution] even before 
Hitler became German Chancellor in 1933.”51 With nary a citation, this 
statement sweeps away one of the most disputed issues in the 
historiography of the Holocaust.52 While this assertion is hardly important 
to his ultimate claim, its presence in the book suggests that we should be 
skeptical of his other claims. 
 
 
 47. Most famously, of course, Hitler was Austrian, not German, and did not move to 
Germany until just before the outbreak of World War I. CHARLES BRACELEN FLOOD, 
HITLER: THE PATH TO POWER 6, 12 (1989). In fact, he did not even become a German citizen 
until just before he challenged Hindenburg for the presidency in 1932. JOHN TOLAND, 
ADOLF HITLER 261 (1976). 
 48. See Robert S. Wistrich, Helping Hitler, COMMENTARY, July 1996, at 29. Tsesis 
occasionally makes reference to the social and economic conditions of Weimar Germany 
but does so as though these conditions were mere happenstance. See, e.g., TSESIS, supra 
note 5, at 110 (“[T]he catastrophe of losing World War I and the hyperinflation that 
followed brought age-old hatreds to the surface, enabling Hitler and his henchmen to win 
broad-based, sustained support.”). In addition, he makes no mention of the fact that both 
Imperial and Weimar Germany had an incitement-to-hatred law similar to the one he 
proposes. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
 49. Norman G. Finkelstein, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s “Crazy” Thesis: A Critique of 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners, in NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN & RUTH BETTINA BIRN, A 
NATION ON TRIAL: THE GOLDHAGEN THESIS AND HISTORICAL TRUTH 1, 14 (1998). 
 50. ENZO TRAVERSO, UNDERSTANDING THE NAZI GENOCIDE: MARXISM AFTER 
AUSCHWITZ 91 (Peter Drucker trans., Pluto Press 1999). 
 51. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 25. 
 52. See Finkelstein, supra note 49, at 16-17 (noting that the dispute between whether 
“Hitler sought from the outset (the intentionalist school) or was pressed by circumstances 
(the functionalist school) to exterminate the Jews” is a “key controversy in the Nazi 
holocaust literature”). 
DESAIFINAL 4/3/2003  2:00 PM 
Number 2] HARM OF BIASED SPEECH 365 
Or consider his uncritical reliance on Daniel Goldhagen’s best-seller 
Hitler’s Willing Executioners. He relies on the book for claims about the 
broad participation of “ordinary Germans” in the implementation of the 
Holocaust,53 a claim more fundamental to his thesis since he argues that 
anti-Semitic attitudes dating back to the Middle Ages that permeated 
German culture ultimately led to the Holocaust. It is hard to understand 
how he could ignore the fact that dozens, if not hundreds, of academic 
historians have roundly rejected Goldhagen’s thesis.54 For him to rely on 
Goldhagen without even acknowledging either the international furor 
raised by Goldhagen’s book or the almost universal rejection of 
Goldhagen’s thesis by professional historians suggests serious gaps, if not 
outright errors, in Tsesis’s historical claims. 
His next claim is that racist ideology led to slavery. He is careful 
never explicitly to say racism caused slavery, but it is hard to understand 
how he can avoid claiming some kind of causal relationship if his ultimate 
argument is that expressions of racist ideology should be proscribed 
because they “pave[d] the way” for slavery.55 Even stated weakly, 
however, as simply a temporal claim that racist ideology preceded state-
sanctioned slavery, Tsesis’s claim is highly contested by historians. Indeed, 
the origins of American slavery and the role racist ideology played have 
been the subject of historical debate for nearly a century.56 Some historians 
argued that slavery originally appeared as a response to economic need and 
 
 53. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 26. 
 54. See, e.g., TRAVERSO, supra note 50, at 91 (“The US and German historical 
communities have almost unanimously declared [Goldhagen’s] book inadmissible as serious 
historical argument.”). See also, e.g., WILLIAM BRUSTEIN, THE LOGIC OF EVIL: THE SOCIAL 
ORIGINS OF THE NAZI PARTY, 1925-1933 (1996); Finkelstein, supra note 49; Robert E. 
Herzstein, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s “Ordinary Germans”: A Heretic and His Critics, 2 J. 
HIST. SOC’Y 89 (2002) (reviewing six books that criticize Goldhagen and further noting that 
historians have been critical of his thesis); Gustav Jahoda, “Ordinary Germans” Before 
Hitler: A Critique of the Goldhagen Thesis, 29 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 69 (1998). 
 55. TSESIS, supra note 5. Indeed, it is not always clear whether he is arguing that racism 
led to slavery or was a post-hoc justification once slavery was in place. For example, at one 
point, he emphasizes the fact that certain hate speech preceded the state-sanctioned 
institution of slavery (and therefore could at least arguably be seen as playing some causal 
role in that institution). Id. at 29. At another point, he notes that hate speech played a role “in 
justifying the institutionalization of hereditary servitude.” Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
Despite this ambiguity, Tsesis’s central thesis requires the former claim—in order to argue 
that hate speech “paves the way for harmful social movements,” as the title of his book 
suggests, he needs to say that racism led to, or in some way caused, slavery, not the other 
way around. Otherwise, how else could outlawing racist ideology, as he suggests, do 
anything to prevent a future calamity such as slavery? I discuss the nature of Tsesis’s causal 
claim in Part III.B. 
 56. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North 
America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1749 (1996). 
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that the racial justification for it emerged only later,57 while others argue 
that slavery was a product of racism.58 This debate is referred to by 
contemporary historians as the “chicken-egg” debate because of a 
widespread view that the question of which came first, racism or slavery, is 
irresolvable.59 Tsesis simply ignores the debate and instead conveniently 
chooses to rely on the historians and evidence that support his claim.60 
Lest I be misunderstood in my critique of Tsesis’s history, let me be 
clear about a few things. First, I do not question what most would consider 
obvious connections between misethnic ideology and the horrific events 
Tsesis discusses. It is virtually beyond dispute that anti-Semitism played 
some role in the Holocaust, that racism was connected in some way to 
American slavery, and that misethnicity was somehow involved in the U.S. 
policy of expelling indigenous Americans from their land. 
Second, I am not arguing that Tsesis is wrong about his historical 
claims, since I have not canvassed the primary sources necessary to address 
such a claim. I am simply suggesting that he has failed to engage the 
historiographical debates on these issues. Thus, the book’s historical claims 
should be viewed with suspicion. 
Finally, let me be clear that I do not view this critique of Tsesis’s 
history by itself as crucial to the ultimate point of the historical examples 
he raises. Under ordinary circumstances, social policy need not be limited 
to addressing the sole cause—or even the most important cause—of social 
ills if implementing a particular policy is likely to prevent or reduce the 
likelihood of the harm. It thus cannot be enough to respond to Tsesis’s call 
for a ban on speech by nitpicking at his history, since he undoubtedly is 
correct that racist ideology has played some role in the perpetuation of 
oppression throughout history. As I explain in the remainder of this 
Review, however, Tsesis’s history does not help us understand either what 
type of role such ideology plays or more importantly what role his 
proposed statute (or any similar such law) might play in reducing the 
likelihood of future harm. 
 
 57. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE 
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975); Oscar & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the Southern 
Labor System, 7 WM. & MARY Q. 199 (1950). 
 58. See WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD 
THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968); Carl N. Degler, Slavery and the Genesis of American Race 
Prejudice, 2 COMP. STUDIES IN SOC’Y & HIST. 49 (1959). 
 59. See generally Wiecek, supra note 56, at 1748-49, n.136. 
 60. Indeed, like a lawyer writing a brief, Tsesis’s only acknowledgement of the 
complex historiographical debate involving the relationship between racism and the origins 
of American slavery consists of a “but see” citation to one of Oscar and Mary Handlin’s 
articles. See TSESIS, supra note 5, at 213 n.3. 
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B. Causation Theory and the Claim that Biased Speech Causes 
Long-Term Harm 
Because Tsesis argues that this historical record justifies a prohibition 
on biased speech, he needs to be able to make some kind of claim about the 
counterfactual situation—he needs to be able to say that his suggested 
changes to law, had they been adopted at some point in the past, would 
have either prevented or reduced the likelihood of injustices such as the 
Holocaust or American slavery.61 To do this, Tsesis’s argument requires 
some kind of a causal claim. 
To the extent that he makes such a claim, however, he runs into two 
difficulties that he simply glosses over: First, law does not operate in a 
vacuum, and the effectiveness of a prohibition of biased speech in actually 
suppressing such speech is highly questionable. Second, because he has 
failed to recognize that the relationship between biased speech and the 
injustices he describes cannot be divorced from the social and economic 
conditions in which the atrocities took place, the causal claim that he makes 
does little to justify his proposed solution—a ban on biased speech. 
One example should suffice to illustrate my first point. Both Imperial 
and Weimar Germany had hate-propaganda laws similar to the anti-biased 
speech law Tsesis proposes,62 and “those laws were enforced with some 
vigour.”63 In 1925, the Bavarian government even banned speeches by 
Hitler—a ban that it was forced to revoke soon thereafter when the Nazis 
“distribut[ed] a drawing of Hitler gagged, with the caption, ‘One alone of 
2,000 million [sic] people of the world is forbidden to speak in 
 
 61. Or that by adopting them today, we would reduce the likelihood of such events in 
the future. 
 62. Indeed, there is a certain irony when Tsesis says that “Germany has passed several 
laws designed to allay the short- and long-term risks of unchecked hate speech.” TSESIS, 
supra note 5, at 187 (emphasis added). At least one of the criminal provisions that Tsesis 
praises, the incitement-to-hatred provision (Section 130 of the German Federal Criminal 
Code), derives from a predecessor incitement-to-hatred statute in the Imperial German 
Criminal Code. See Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against 
the “Auschwitz”—and Other—“Lies,” 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 282 (1986); see also Ambrose 
Doskow & Sidney B. Jacoby, Anti-Semitism and the Law in Pre-Nazi Germany, 3 
CONTEMP. JEWISH REC. 498, 503 (1940). 
 63. A. ALAN BOROVOY, WHEN FREEDOMS COLLIDE: THE CASE FOR OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES 
50 (1988). “During the fifteen years before Hitler came to power, there were more than two 
hundred prosecutions based on anti-semitic speech.” Id. These included prosecutions against 
some notable Nazis whom Tsesis describes as purveyors of “hate speech,” including 
Theodor Fritsch, Joseph Goebbels, and Julius Streicher. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 19-20, 24, 
25. See Doskow & Jacoby, supra note 62, at 502-03, 505. Indeed, even the statement “The 
Jews are our misfortune!”—a quintessential example of what Tsesis calls “hate speech”—
had been forbidden by a court injunction in the years before Hitler came to power. TSESIS, 
supra note 5, at 18 (referring to the phrase as “a painful dart with slow-acting poison”); 
Doskow & Jacoby, supra note 62, at 508. 
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Germany.’”64 Some opponents of “hate speech” laws have argued that this 
alone should be enough to convince us not to adopt such laws,65 but this is 
not my point. Rather, my point is simply that the change in law Tsesis 
suggests would not necessarily even reduce the amount of biased speech in 
a society, let alone reduce the likelihood of a future Holocaust, since we 
know that there was a good deal of such speech in pre-Nazi Germany at a 
time when a variation of his proposal was the law.66 
As for my second point, we need to look more closely at exactly what 
sort of causal connection Tsesis alleges between the speech and the harm. 
Before doing this, let me step back for a moment and look broadly at three 
different types of causal claims that could be made about the relationship 
between biased speech and the atrocities Tsesis describes.67 Doing so will 
allow us to understand not only what Tsesis’s argument does claim, but 
also what it does not. 
One approach to saying that biased speech causes harm would be to 
rely on what is known as “deterministic” or “logical” causation.68 The 
statement “C is a cause of E” means simply that “C is one of a set of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the occurrence 
of E. . . . [I]f any one member of the set [which I will designate C(d)] is 
absent, E will never occur. If every member of [C(d)] is present, E will 
always occur.”69 In this sense, if we were to denominate biased speech C1, 
and perhaps a whole host of other known and unknown social, historical, 
and cultural factors C2 through Cn, this approach amounts to saying that 
biased speech “causes” harm because it is a logically necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition for the harm. One thing to note here—and I will return 
to this in a moment—is that, in this approach to causation, because each  
 
 
 64. ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND 
THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 165 (1979). 
 65. See, e.g., id.; Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 829, 856-57 (McLachlin, J., 
dissenting); BOROVOY, supra note 63. Cf. Doskow & Jacoby, supra note 62, at 498 (“It is 
arguable that the judicial machinery is essentially inappropriate for the suppression of a 
political movement, that prosecutions make martyrs of the defendants and give them new 
audiences but do not deter them or others from carrying on their agitation.”). 
 66. “The German experience . . . demonstrates that a set of rules in the books, coupled 
with organized private effort to secure enforcement, provides no barrier to the triumph of a 
fanatical campaign to pin the woes of a nation upon a helpless minority.” Doskow & 
Jacoby, supra note 62, at 509. 
 67. My taxonomy here is lifted wholesale from Frederick Schauer’s article on causation 
and sexual violence. See Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual 
Violence, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 737, 742-54. 
 68. This approach is most commonly associated with David Hume and, in a variation 
that is not important here, John Stuart Mill. 
 69. Schauer, supra note 67, at 742-43. 
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and every “cause” is necessary to the effect, it is logically no more helpful 
to say C1 causes E than to say C2 or any other member of C(d) causes E. 
A second type is what Frederick Schauer refers to as “attributive” 
causation. Variations on this approach are familiar to lawyers, as they are 
commonly used in tort and criminal law. The idea here is to start with 
deterministic causation, but then to take it a step further and choose among 
the logically equivalent causal candidates—that is, among the set C(d)—
one or a few that seem really causal. How we “attribute” causation to one 
of the logical causes rather than another is, of course, a difficult task, but it 
is important that there be “some reason for selecting some rather than other 
causes for this attribution.”70 Not surprisingly, philosophers and legal 
scholars have been grappling with this problem for quite some time. 
Schauer cites two prominent approaches, and for my purposes, this will 
suffice. One method, associated with H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, is to 
rely on the “common sense” notion of “cause,” which they argue amounts 
to choosing among the set of causes only those that are unusual or 
“abnormal.”71 A second methodology, which Schauer ascribes to Guido 
Calabresi, is to choose among the set of logical causes “those pressure 
points that are most amenable to the social goals we wish to accomplish.”72 
Put another way, since we begin our inquiry about causation with the 
knowledge that we intend to use our conclusion to advocate legal change, 
we choose from among the logical causes “those it is reasonable to suppose 
the legal system can do something about, whether by way of deterrence or 
otherwise.”73 So one way to characterize this in our context would be to 
argue that biased speech should be treated as either unusual or somehow 
more amenable to legal change than any of the other possible causes of an 
atrocity such as the Holocaust. 
For Schauer’s third type of causation, we need to put aside our 
conception of deterministic or logical causation. Most variations on logical 
causation, including those I have referred to as “attributive,” tend to focus 
on determining the cause of a single effect. So they can be quite helpful if 
we ask, perhaps, what caused Kristallnacht as a singular event on the night 
of November 9, 1938. To answer the question, we might inquire about the 
 
 70. Id. at 747. 
 71. See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 26-61 (2d ed. 
1985). 
 72. Schauer, supra note 67, at 748 n.25 (quoting Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause 
and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975)); see also Felix S. Cohen, Field 
Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 252 (1950) (“What we actually do when we 
look for a legal cause is to pick out of this infinity of intersecting strands a useful point at 
which public pressure can be placed.” (citations omitted)). 
 73. Schauer, supra note 67, at 748 (citations omitted). 
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set C(d) and then ask, for example, whether Luther’s 1543 book On the 
Jews and Their Lies (which is hard to read without being reminded of the 
very burning of synagogues that took place on Kristallnacht) is a member 
of that set, and then ask whether we should hold Luther responsible for 
Kristallnacht because his book is a particularly important member of that 
set. In contrast, if we are interested in “trying to determine what types of 
events, as classes”—for example, biased speech—“produce what types of 
events, as consequences”74—for example, genocide—it makes more sense 
to look to what Schauer refers to as “probabilistic” causation, an approach 
to causality that is central to the methodology of the social sciences.75 
Under a probabilistic account of causation, a causal relationship exists, 
for types or classes, insofar as the putative cause increases the 
incidence of the effect, and a causal relationship exists, in particular 
cases, insofar as the putative cause increases the probability of the 
effect. . . . [U]nder any version of probabilistic causation the goal is to 
look for factors that enable us to say that E is more likely, or more 
probable, when C is present than when C is not.76 
With this background, let us return to Tsesis’s claim. Since he relies 
on historical—in his words, “empirical”77—evidence, one would expect 
him to use probabilistic causation—that is, to make some kind of a claim 
that biased speech increases the likelihood of horrors such as the 
Holocaust. But if we look both at the way he actually articulates his claim 
and his methodology, he appears simply to be making a claim about 
logical, or deterministic, causation: biased speech is a “cause” of the 
Holocaust, Tsesis tells us, because it is a necessary condition for the 
Holocaust.78 
What should we conclude from this? First, as intuitive as this 
conclusion sounds,79 it tells us practically nothing: biased speech has been 
 
 74. Id. at 751. 
 75. Id. at 752. 
 76. Id. at 752-53. 
 77. Tsesis’s law review article on which the book was based was entitled “Empirical 
Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence.” See TSESIS, supra note 5, at ix. 
 78. See id. at 170 (“Although hate speech does not always lead to organized 
supremacism, it is a necessary ingredient to that end.”). Other examples of Tsesis 
characterizing biased speech as simply a background condition necessary for the atrocities 
include the following statements: “The hatreds . . . will not always burgeon into action. For 
that, social strains have to be at a peak. But they will lie dormant until the season is right for 
the noxious ideas to bud into violence.” Id. at 172. “Although most barking (antilocution) 
does not lead to biting, yet there is never a bite without previous barking.” Id. at 102 
(quoting GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 57 (25th Anniversary ed. 1979)) 
“[H]einous crimes can be committed anywhere misethnicity has donned the raiment of 
acceptable dialogue.” Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 79. To start, let me say that it strikes me as almost definitely correct. Nonetheless, 
because his history ignores the social, cultural, and economic factors that undoubtedly 
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around since history began. As a logical matter, then, it is no more helpful 
to say that anti-Semitic speech caused the Holocaust than to say organized 
government caused it, or, for that matter, to say that oxygen caused it. All 
were necessary ingredients, but all have been present in every historical 
epoch in every country in the world. Second, even if it is not true that there 
has been biased speech in every society from time immemorial, it is hard to 
imagine anyone disagreeing with Tsesis’s historical premise if the claim is 
merely that biased speech was a necessary condition for the atrocities that 
followed. 80 However, as James Weinstein has put it: 
[I]t does not [thereby] follow . . . that the increase in racist beliefs 
caused by the speech that proponents of hate speech legislation would 
suppress will lead to the reinstitution of slavery, legally imposed racial 
segregation, or genocide. . . . There would have to be far-reaching 
changes in American society and institutions before racist beliefs could 
lead to such enormous injuries.81 
Deterministic causation is thus not particularly helpful. Beyond 
deterministic causation, what else might Tsesis be saying? His argument 
 
played at least some role in each of the injustices he describes, Tsesis has failed to make the 
case even for deterministic causation. In fact, he may well have made the classic error of 
confusing correlation with causation. When ice cream sales go up, so, too, does the amount 
of bare skin one sees at the beach. If correlation were causation, those who sought to keep 
bare skin from plain view could call for a ban on ice cream sales and feel confident their 
goal would be accomplished. The problem, of course, is that, while there is a strong 
correlation between bare skin and ice cream sales, there is not likely to be a causal 
connection at all. Rather, both are, in turn, caused by a third independent factor, namely 
warm weather. 
Tsesis’s claim may well suffer this same logical flaw. He claims a linkage between biased 
speech on the one hand and the Holocaust or slavery on the other. Yet he ignores one 
possible connection between biased speech and the injustices he describes—both biased 
speech and the injustices are caused by an independent third factor, namely the background 
economic and social conditions. Of course, this is likely a gross oversimplification. The 
links are no doubt far more complex. But because Tsesis in effect treats biased speech as an 
exogenous variable (the “spark”) to be inserted into history waiting for social and economic 
conditions to cause the harm (the “flame” or the “conflagration”), he has failed to address 
the question of whether biased speech (or, at least, an increased incidence of the type of 
biased speech that might lead to concrete harms) might itself be a result of certain social and 
economic conditions. Id. at 139 (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925)). 
 80. Even those generally viewed as skeptical of banning “hate speech” recognize this 
fact. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 131 (“[I]t is undeniable that catastrophic injuries 
to racial or ethnic groups such as slavery and segregation in the United States or the 
Holocaust in Europe could not have occurred in the absence of widespread racist 
beliefs . . . .”). See also infra Part IV.A. (discussing American Booksellers’ Ass’n v. 
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)). As I noted above, I consider it almost a given that 
racist ideology has played some role—perhaps even a significant one—in perpetuating 
inequities against minorities in this country and abroad, including in each of the historical 
examples Tsesis gives. 
 81. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 131; cf. Floyd Abrams, Hate Speech: The Present 
Implications of a Historical Dilemma, 37 VILL. L. REV. 743, 754-55 (1992). 
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appears to be implicitly relying on some form of what Schauer refers to as 
attributive causation,82 but he gives us little reason to attribute causation to 
speech rather than any number of social, cultural, economic, and/or 
political factors. Perhaps he believes that biased speech is, in Calabresi’s 
words, one of those “pressure points that are most amenable”83 to the goal 
of reducing the possibility of a future Holocaust. If so, however, he 
provides no evidence of this, and, as I described earlier,84 the German 
experience prior to the Third Reich provides at least some anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that biased speech is not particularly susceptible to 
pressure from a legal system, and that criminalization would do little to 
prevent a horrific event such as the Holocaust. 
Let us ignore this anecdotal evidence, however, and give Tsesis’s 
arguments the benefit of the doubt. There is, after all, something intuitive 
about blaming racist ideology for systemic crimes such as the Holocaust 
and American slavery, crimes that seem so obviously linked to attitudes 
about racial inferiority. Therefore, let us assume that, among the multitude 
of necessary conditions for a future genocide or institutional slavery, biased 
speech is one of the more important ones. Even if we make this 
assumption, however, it does not advance Tsesis’s argument very far: he 
may have made an argument based on deterministic causation or on some 
form of attributive causation, but he has clearly not made one based on 
probabilistic causation. This is clear for two reasons: First, nowhere does 
he articulate the claim as one about probabilistic causation. Second, and 
more important, his methodology simply does not allow a claim about 
probabilistic causation. He has not even attempted to ask—let alone 
answer—the question of whether there is any probabilistic relationship 
between biased speech (the hypothesized independent variable) and long-
term harm (the hypothesized dependent variable). To even begin to make 
an empirical claim about the relationship between biased speech and long-
term harm, one needs to ask the question comparatively. I explore this 
theme in the next Section. 
 
 
 82. Here is one example of what appears to be the implication that biased speech is 
particularly important among the causes: “Overwhelming historical, psychological, and 
sociological evidence demonstrates that hate speech has been and continues to be 
instrumental in initiating and perpetuating great human injustices.” TSESIS, supra note 5, at 
193 (emphasis added). 
 83. Schauer, supra note 67, at 748 n.25 (quoting Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause 
and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 106 (1975)). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
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C. The Need for Comparative Analysis 
The penultimate chapter of Tsesis’s book gives a brief survey of the 
wide variety of countries that have adopted hate-speech legislation and 
concludes that U.S. jurisprudence is “anomalous.”85 Drawing on the 
experiences of other countries is becoming increasingly common in debates 
about a whole host of policy questions, from health-care policy86 to labor 
market flexibility,87 and it is in general a trend I applaud. When used 
properly, a comparative analysis can lead to insights that are more useful 
than those derived from ideological positions about the “free market” or, 
for example, being “tough on crime.” If a common policy goal can be 
 
 85. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 192. Others have also noted American exceptionalism in 
this area. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 38 (1986) (“It seems a significant piece of corroborating 
evidence that virtually every other western democracy does draw such a distinction in their 
law; the United States stands virtually alone in the degree to which it has decided legally to 
tolerate racist rhetoric.”); SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN 
CONTROVERSY 159 (1994); Kathleen Sullivan, Freedom of Expression in the United States: 
Past and Present, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 1, 9 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2001); Credence Fogo-Schensul, Note, More 
Than a River in Egypt: Holocaust Denial, The Internet, and International Freedom of 
Expression Norms, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 241, 247 (1997-98). 
 86. See, e.g., Eric Beaudan, Canadian Model of Healthcare Ails, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Aug. 28, 2002), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0828/p01s04-
wogi.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). 
 87. Compare, e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 88-121 
(1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/0599ch4.pdf, with 
John Schmitt & Jonathan Wadsworth, Is the OECD Jobs Strategy Behind US and British 
Employment and Unemployment Success in the 1990s? (2002) (unpublished paper prepared 
for “Liberalization and Employment Performance in the OECD,” CEPA, New School 
University, May 18-19, 2001) (on file with Journal). If Tsesis wanted to argue that 
regulation of biased speech is a moral question and that the fact that many other countries 
have adopted such legislation evidences a growing international consensus on the issue, 
Tsesis could presumably draw on the Supreme Court’s recent changes in Eighth 
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 
2249-50 n.21 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1987); id. at 389 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). One of the best recent examples of the deep divide as to the merits 
of considering foreign court decisions in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence was the Court’s 
recent denial of certiorari in the Charles Foster case, involving the question of whether an 
extraordinarily long delay before execution violates the Eighth Amendment. Compare 
Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 472 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(noting the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision to consider a lengthy delay in executions in 
the United States as a factor to consider in extraditions) with id. at 470 n.* (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“While Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider 
the actions of other nations on any issue it likes, this Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”). See also 
generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 37 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. 
Fox eds., 1996). 
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agreed upon,88 one can use comparative data to begin to understand which 
policies might best further that goal. Drawing on the diverse experiences of 
other countries with similar policy problems can thereby help in the search 
for solutions to these problems. 
Unfortunately, however, Tsesis’s reliance on the speech regulations of 
other countries fails to advance our understanding of whether a prohibition 
on racist ideologies is a good thing. He does little more than assert that the 
United States is wrong and the rest of the world is right and then simply 
concludes the book with a one-size-fits-all statutory provision.89 This is a 
shame because, by looking at other countries, one might be able to learn 
something about the importance of history and social context in the broader 
question of “hate speech” regulation. For example, a nation’s historical 
legacy might have an impact on the merits of speech restrictions in 
particular countries, and in particular on whether specific “historically 
persecuted groups” might warrant specific legislation in individual 
countries;90 or, a more careful look at social and historical context might 
 
 88. I certainly do not mean to imply that this is a trivial step. 
 89. In a literal sense, he proposes two different statutes—one “for European countries 
whose experience with the dangerous effects of misethnic messages is extensive” and a 
second which he believes would have “a greater likelihood of passing” in the United States. 
TSESIS, supra note 5, at 207. His second statute simply replaces the phrase “historically 
persecuted group” with the phrase “identifiable group,” perhaps because he suspects the 
latter phrase would be less open to constitutional attack. (As I note below, see infra Part IV, 
both statutes would fail under Brandenburg.) Nonetheless, his critique of U.S. doctrine 
suggests that the second statute is simply an attempt to incorporate portions of that doctrine 
notwithstanding a disagreement with it. In any event, the two statutes are effectively the 
same for the purposes of my current argument. I discuss the details of the statutes below. 
For now, however, let me note that Tsesis clearly favors the first and seems to believe that 
this proposed statute would reduce the likelihood of a future calamity such as slavery or the 
Holocaust. 
 90. It might be one thing for the United States to look to the impact of legislation 
outlawing anti-Semitic ideology in Canada, for example. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, 
FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 47-70 (1995) 
[hereinafter GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS]. It would be another thing altogether to look 
to the impact of, or rationale for, such laws in Germany or in Israel. In Germany, for 
example, a simple denial of the Holocaust violates the law. See § 130 Nr. 3 StGB (German 
Penal Code), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#130. But, on the 
question of laws prohibiting expressions of anti-Semitic ideology, one simply cannot 
generalize from German law to that of the United States, notwithstanding Tsesis’s desire to 
do so. See TSESIS, supra note 5, at 188. As one German commentator has recently put it, the 
law prohibiting Holocaust denials “cannot be justified along the lines of traditionally 
accepted free speech doctrine. It can be justified only against the background of the singular 
significance of the Holocaust to the self-image of all Germans.” Winfried Brugger, Ban On 
or Protection of Hate Speech?: Some Observations Based on German and American Law, 
17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 18 (2002) (emphasis added). Commentators have begun to 
analyze the broader policy question of “hate speech” regulation in a comparative manner. 
See, e.g., Fogo-Schensul, supra note 85; Bradley A. Appleman, Note, Hate Speech: A 
Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
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help elucidate how “hate speech” regulation fits into the broader role that 
law in general plays in particular countries.91 
Ultimately, it may be that part of what is shaping Tsesis’s approach is 
an attempt—perhaps even a subconscious one—to suppress racist ideology 
because he sees racist views as wrong in an objective sense.92 When he 
discusses slavery, for example, he says, “The folk belief in the economic 
benefits of slave labor turns out to have been as spurious as all other 
dogmas built on misethnicity.”93 While he may well be correct that the 
economic benefits of slave labor in the context of the American South were 
overstated, the way he makes his claim shows that he views the supporting 
economic studies he describes as almost secondary to the fact that a claim 
about the economic benefits of slave labor is a “dogma[] built on 
misethnicity.”94 
 
422 (1996); MICHEL ROSENFELD, HATE SPEECH IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Cardozo Law Sch. Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, 
Working Paper Series No. 41, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
265939; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of 
the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1999); 
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra; UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, 
LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 
1993); STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992). If Tsesis had attempted to place the issue in the 
social and historical context of a particular country rather than proposing a single law that 
fails to account for the different circumstances in different countries, he might have been 
able to use his deep foray into historical research to inform this dialogue. 
 91. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 
YALE L.J. 1279 (2000) (arguing that “hate speech” regulations in France and Germany must 
be viewed as part of the broader role that respect and civility play throughout the law of 
those countries). 
 92. One can certainly argue that racist ideology should be proscribed for its own sake 
based on at least two different rationales. First, one can argue that racist ideology should be 
outlawed because it is simply wrong in an objective sense. Cf., e.g., Wright, supra note 11, 
at 10 (arguing that the “law should not ignore what a hard-won societal consensus has 
established as the elemental wrongness of the use of racial epithets”). Second, one could 
also argue that such speech should be proscribed based on the expressive value of the law—
that is, because the law represents an expression of society’s collective values. See, e.g., 
Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2379-80 (“In a society that expresses its moral judgments 
through the law, and in which the rule of law and the use of law are characteristic responses 
to many social phenomena, this absence of laws against racist speech is telling.”). Neither of 
these, however, is Tsesis’s argument for a criminal statute. Rather, his claim is that we 
should criminalize biased speech because the harms it engenders are concrete and 
significant. 
 93. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 45. 
 94. Here are a few other telling examples suggesting that Tsesis believes that racist 
views are themselves the problem. In his chapter on the U.S. policy of expelling indigenous 
Americans from their land in the mid-nineteenth century, he says: “Voices opposed to 
removal were audible through the din of mischaracterizations, but the truths they enunciated 
and the democratic themes they sounded were not triumphant in the marketplace of ideas.” 
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Since Tsesis already appears to be certain that “all dogmas built on 
misethnicity” are spurious and that “aggressive ideology” necessarily 
results in an inaccurate depiction of its targets, he doesn’t feel the need to 
ask the more interesting questions that arise when the issue of hate-speech 
legislation in other countries is raised: Are outgroups better off in a regime 
that prohibits “hate speech”? Are they less likely to suffer hate crimes 
(either defined as individually motivated bias crimes or mass systemic 
crimes such as genocide or slavery)? Are “harmful social movements” less 
likely to arise? That Tsesis doesn’t conduct a thorough study of these 
questions can of course be excused; no book can do everything. But he 
unfortunately fails even to ask these questions and instead simply assumes 
that regimes with criminal prohibitions of “hate speech” are better for 
“outgroups.” 
While I don’t know the answers to any of these questions, I imagine 
the issue is quite complex. I also suspect that the correlation between 
hate-speech legislation and a lower incidence of hate crimes, if even 
positive, is probably slight.95 And one would have to show, at the very 
least, that the correlation is positive before one could make even a prima 
facie case for “hate speech” legislation based on this sort of rationale. 
Moreover, if one is looking for “pressure points that are most amenable 
to”96 government influence, I imagine that economic growth, social welfare 
protection, levels of housing integration, public financing of educational 
opportunities, or any number of social and/or economic factors are better 
candidates. This is likely to be so not only because I suspect these factors 
have a significantly higher correlation with the incidence of hate crimes 
(again, no matter how defined) than the presence of “hate speech” 
 
 
 
Id. at 61. Or consider this broader statement: “Rather than enlightening listeners through 
accurate depiction of its subjects, hate speech menaces outgroups through false 
characterizations and aggressive ideology.” Id. at 200. He is almost certainly correct, as a 
factual matter, that certain expressions of “hate speech” in certain contexts “menace[] 
outgroups.” For social science research supporting this point, see Laura Beth Nielsen, 
Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in Public as Hate Speech, 58 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 265 (2002), which uses field observations and interviews to document the reactions 
of those who are targets of racist and sexist remarks. The problem, though, is that Tsesis 
considers it beyond dispute that “aggressive ideology” necessarily results in an “[in]accurate 
depiction of its subjects,” and it is of course just that point that the First Amendment leaves 
for the citizenry to debate. I return to this theme below. See infra text accompanying notes 
133-34. 
 95. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that Imperial and Weimar 
Germany had hate-propaganda prohibitions). 
 96. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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prohibitions,97 but also because they are far better targets of government 
intervention. 
This leads me back to a point I raised at the end of the previous 
Section about Tsesis’s reliance on historical examples to support his view 
that “hate speech” should be criminalized: a different methodology would 
have more effectively uncovered the relevant facts. Tsesis bases his 
argument on carefully chosen historical examples that are designed to elicit 
outrage, but he does so without any comparative analysis at all. To make 
credible assertions about the role racist ideology plays in various historical 
examples, it is not enough simply to make a deterministic causal claim that 
expressions of racist ideology were “necessary” for the persecution to take 
place. Rather, one must do comparative socio-historical analysis and ask 
whether there is a causal connection in the probabilistic sense. While a 
comprehensive international comparative study might be too difficult, a 
comparative case study would not be, and this approach could be quite 
enlightening. 
So let us return to the question of the Holocaust, Tsesis’s first 
example in his argument for a ban on biased speech. Tsesis claims that 
anti-Semitic ideology developing slowly over centuries led to the 
Holocaust. While he gives lip service to the role that social and economic 
conditions played,98 the crux of his point is that the expression of anti-
Semitic views, during but particularly before the Nazi era, was part of what 
allowed the Holocaust to happen. To show causation in the relevant sense, 
however, one needs at least one example of a historical situation in which 
social and economic conditions were comparable with Weimar Germany, 
and yet there was no misethnic ideology. Or if we ask the question the 
other way around, why was it in Germany rather than in any number of 
other European countries that the Nazis came to power? Was the level of 
anti-Semitic messages higher in Germany? Many historians argue that the 
answer is “no,”99 which suggests that there may not even be a correlative 
 
 97. Cf. Gates, supra note 21, at 57 (“Alas, even if hate did disappear, aggregative 
patterns of segregation and segmentation in housing and employment would not. 
Conversely, in the absence of this material and economic gap, no one would much care 
about racist speech.” (emphasis added)). 
 98. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 110. 
 99. See, e.g., Wistrich, supra note 48: 
[I]n any ranking of anti-Semitism in the pre-1914 era, Germany must be put some 
distance behind not only Austria but several other European countries. Since its 
unification in 1870, Germany had experienced nothing comparable to the anti-
Semitic paroxysm during the Dreyfus Affair in France, Lueger’s electoral 
triumphs in Vienna, the systematic persecution of Jews in Romania, or the 
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connection let alone a causal one in the relevant, probabilistic sense. 
Without asking a comparative question, one simply does not know whether 
every society, when faced with the economic and social conditions of 
Weimar Germany, would necessarily have responded with some sort of 
discriminatory oppression (whether based on race or ethnicity or any 
number of other grounds), irrespective of what happened in the 
immediately preceding nine centuries in that country.100 If this is true (and 
Tsesis gives us no information one way or the other to answer this 
question), then how could a ban on biased speech help even to reduce the 
probability of future calamities such as the Holocaust? 
Tsesis does discuss the social psychology of scapegoating,101 but 
none of this discussion explains the important question: Why did the 
Holocaust happen when it did and where it did? His theory of social 
scapegoating, premised as it is on human psychology, does nothing to help 
us understand why, for example, the Holocaust did not occur in France at 
the time of the Dreyfus affair.102 Or for that matter, given Tsesis’s 
indictment of Luther as partly responsible for the Holocaust,103 why it did 
not happen in German-speaking lands in the late sixteenth century. 
His claims about American slavery suffer from the same 
methodological flaw. As I have noted above, historians hotly contest 
Tsesis’s claim that racism led to slavery. Even accepting Tsesis’s view of 
history, however, the relevant causal question can be answered only by 
looking at things comparatively. For example, why was there slavery in 
 
devastating pogroms in czarist Russia, then universally seen as the greatest 
persecutor of the Jews. 
Id. at 29. 
 100. I note that in his historical examples Tsesis focuses entirely on the national level. 
What is interesting is that while he views the United States as a “hate speech haven” in the 
Internet era, he completely ignores the fact that ideas, whether racist or otherwise, have 
always crossed international borders. Surely French anti-Semites in the 1930s had just as 
much access to the expression of anti-Semitic ideologies as did the Germans. And if he 
wants to indict Luther for the Holocaust because Nazis “periodically invoked Luther’s 
teachings to justify passing anti-Semitic laws and racial policies,” then presumably the 
Danes, whose state church has been Lutheran since 1536, are more connected ideologically 
to Luther than was the Austrian Hitler who grew up in the Catholic Church. TSESIS, supra 
note 5, at 12. See also supra note 46. 
 101. Id. at 85-98. 
 102. In the 1890s, the French Intelligence Service determined that a spy had passed 
secret military documents to the Germans. Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a wealthy Jew from 
Alsace, was wrongly accused of being the spy. After learning of the accusation, the 
publisher of one of the many anti-Semitic papers in France began a vitriolic campaign 
against the Jewish officer, and in a wave of anti-Semitic fervor, Dreyfus was convicted of 
high treason after a farcical trial based on the flimsiest of evidence. See generally ERIC 
CAHM, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR IN FRENCH SOCIETY AND POLITICS (1996). 
 103. See supra note 46 (citing TSESIS, supra note 5, at 25). 
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British North America, but not in Britain? Were expressions of racist 
ideology stronger in the colonies? Were they nonexistent in the mother 
country? These strike me as the type of questions one needs to ask if one’s 
goal is to understand the role “hate speech” plays in “pav[ing] the way for 
harmful social movements” (as the subtitle of Tsesis’s book puts it). 
In sum, Tsesis’s methodology fails to ask the one question we need to 
know before we even begin to address the merits of his proposed statute: Is 
there a causal relationship, in the probabilistic sense, between biased 
speech and any subsequent harm? Moreover, because his only claim is that 
biased speech was a logical cause of—that is, a necessary condition for—
the oppression he describes, the relevant corollary of that claim is the 
following: If a society could completely eliminate all biased speech, it 
would thereby necessarily prevent a future Holocaust. Even accepting his 
premise at face value, then, he has not made any showing that a reduction 
in biased speech will decrease the likelihood or probability of a future 
Holocaust (or will reduce the incidence of individual bias crimes), because 
he has not asked the relevant question. 
IV.  CRIMINAL LAW AS A SOLUTION TO THE LONG-TERM HARM 
CAUSED BY BIASED SPEECH 
Thus far, my critique has evinced a certain skepticism to Tsesis’s 
premise, but I have studiously avoided taking his criticism of Brandenburg 
head on. In this Part, then, we shall assume that Tsesis’s history is flawless 
and his deterministic causal claim is sufficiently supported. Let us even 
assume, therefore, the corollary of that causal claim: If a society could in 
fact suppress the relevant104 misethnic speech today, we would eliminate 
the possibility of a future calamity such as the Holocaust.105 Tsesis likely 
would respond: “Surely then, we should do so.” Perhaps, but even with this 
assumption, Tsesis’s conclusion runs into difficulties in the American 
context, difficulties for which he has failed sufficiently to account. In 
particular, the implications of his argument—that the United States should 
abandon Brandenburg for a rule that permits government to justify the 
suppression of speech on the basis of any causal connection to violence 
 
 104. By this, I mean that I assume further that we could precisely delineate which 
misethnic speech leads to the actions we wish to avoid. See supra Part II. 
 105. Recall that, since he is making a deterministic causal claim (biased speech is a 
necessary condition to a future Holocaust) rather than a probabilistic causal claim (biased 
speech increases the probability of a future Holocaust), the corollary is that his proposal will 
completely eliminate the possibility of a future Holocaust, not that it will simply reduce the 
possibility of one. 
Note that I am focused here simply on the logic of Tsesis’s argument. We need not assume, 
therefore, that his proposed statute will in fact suppress all of the relevant biased speech. 
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orharm, no matter how remote106—go far beyond biased speech and raise 
First Amendment problems that cannot be overcome by a simple appeal to 
the horrendous harm the speech causes.107 
I put the point in terms of the First Amendment, since doctrinally that 
is where Tsesis’s thesis runs into trouble, but my approach might be 
likened to what environmental policymakers call “comparative risk 
analysis”108—a comparison of the benefits of that proposal, discounted by 
the probability that it will in fact prevent the harms at which it is aimed, 
with the risks that adopting the proposal would entail. 
Before I address what I view as some of the risks of Tsesis’s proposal, 
however, let me point out a few things: First, even though I will assume for 
now that he has made a claim of deterministic or logical causation, I want 
to emphasize that I consider the probability of an event like the Holocaust 
or a reinstitution of slavery to be extremely low in the present-day United 
States, even without the adoption of a ban on biased speech.109 Biased 
speech may be a necessary condition for such harm, but it is obviously not 
a sufficient one. Therefore, while I am assuming at the moment that a 
complete elimination of biased speech would necessarily prevent a future 
Holocaust from happening, I am not assuming that such an event would 
happen in the absence of a complete ban on biased speech. 
Second, it is important to view Tsesis’s desire to abandon 
Brandenburg in light of the fact that the First Amendment currently permits 
the imposition of various forms of liability for expressions of racist 
ideology.110 Title VII race discrimination suits,111 criminal liability for 
 
 106. Recall that Tsesis’s connection includes speech that occurs centuries before the 
harm. See supra note 46. 
 107. Let me be clear that I am not arguing that Brandenburg is defensible in all its 
particulars. As Kent Greenawalt has pointed out, the implications of the Court’s language 
are not obvious and potentially are troubling if taken literally. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech 
and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 650-53 [hereinafter Greenawalt, Speech and 
Crime]. My focus is solely on Tsesis’s claim that government should be able to use the 
possibility of long-term harm as a rationale for suppressing speech. Moreover, as I noted in 
Part II, Tsesis might be aiming at an extremely broad swath of speech. So, there may be a 
number of First Amendment doctrines that Tsesis’s proposal would have to overcome. Here, 
I focus solely on Brandenburg because Tsesis’s statutory proposal criminalizes incitement 
to discriminate and would thus clearly be unconstitutional under Brandenburg. 
 108. See generally Colloquy, Risk in the Republic: Comparative Risk Analysis and 
Public Policy, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1997). 
 109. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
 110. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 61-65. 
 111. See, e.g., Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould, Inc., 130 F.3d 349 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that persistent use of racist epithets by employer when referring to black 
employee violates Title VII). 
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racist-inspired threats,112 and penalty enhancements for hate crimes113 are 
all examples of ways in which the law, in effect, penalizes individuals for 
the expression of racist views. Presumably, Tsesis would agree that biased 
speech in these circumstances also contributes to an increased likelihood of 
an atrocity such as the Holocaust. Therefore, to the extent that one accepts 
Tsesis’s view about the long-term harm caused by biased speech, the 
benefits to be gained from Tsesis’s proposal must be limited to the speech 
that it would suppress beyond that which is already proscribable under 
current doctrine.114 To the extent that speech already proscribable also 
contributes to the long-term harm Tsesis chronicles, he cannot use such 
speech in the balance sheet of harm even if his statute presumably would 
cover many of those circumstances. 
A. Brandenburg, Biased Speech, and Government Power 
Tsesis’s thesis that the law should consider the long-term harm of 
speech is a direct attack on Brandenburg. Therefore, let us examine that 
case. Brandenburg involved the prosecution of a Ku Klux Klan leader 
under a “criminal syndicalism” statute, one that prohibited the advocacy of 
“crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform.”115 The defendant, Clarence 
Brandenburg, had organized a “rally” with twelve Klansmen at which he 
had made comments such as “Send the Jews back to Israel” and “Bury the 
niggers,” slogans that were then followed by a claim that, “We’re not a 
revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme 
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that 
there might have to be some revengeance taken. We are marching on 
Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong.”116 No one was at 
the “rally” other than the twelve Klansmen along with a reporter and a 
cameraman, both of whom Brandenburg had invited to film the event. He 
was found guilty of criminal syndicalism and the Ohio Supreme Court 
upheld his conviction. 
 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1193 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(upholding conviction for making threats when defendant repeatedly made anti-Semitic 
phone calls to a Jewish organization and sending the organization letters calling for the 
deaths of Israeli leaders). But cf. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001) 
(reversing convictions under cross-burning statute notwithstanding allegations that the 
cross-burning constituted a threat), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 2288 (2002). 
 113. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
 114. The costs would likewise be so limited. But, as we will see, the costs are directly 
related to the speech he would proscribe that is currently protected by the First Amendment. 
 115. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 2923.13). 
 116. Id. at 446, n.1. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction and invalidated the 
statute. In so doing, the Court fashioned what is now viewed as the 
modern-day “clear and present danger” principle: The First Amendment 
forbids the government from proscribing “advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”117 In short, a speaker who advocates destructive action by others 
must intend that her statements produce imminent action and there must be 
a strong likelihood that the action will occur. Any looser connection 
between speech and subsequent action is treated as advocacy protected by 
the First Amendment. 
Now consider Tsesis’s assessment of the case. He states that 
Brandenburg “is based on the false assumption that the advocacy of future 
violence cannot have devastating effects.”118 This is a narrow and 
unpersuasive understanding of the case,119 raising two issues: First, he fails 
to understand that the logic of his argument goes far beyond racist speech. 
Second, he fails to understand that the theory that government must show a 
likelihood of imminent harm before suppressing speech that can cause 
harmful action does not deny that speech can have “devastating effects” 
over the long term. Rather, it is built largely on the view that the dangers of 
allowing government to criminalize such speech are greater. In fact, one 
need look no further than the judicial response to an arguably analogous 
type of speech, pornography, to see these two points clearly articulated. 
 
 117. Id. at 447. 
 118. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 137 (citation omitted). See also id. at 139 (“It is unduly 
facile to discount all but the most imminently dangerous calls to repressive actions as 
benign.”); id. at 193 (“[T]he United States has maintained a head-in-the-sand approach to 
historical realities by refusing to acknowledge that any but the most immediate dangers can 
result from words targeting identifiable outgroups.”). 
 119. In the text, I address what I view as Tsesis’s misunderstanding of the real reasons 
for the rule in Brandenburg, but it strikes me as implausible, from the standpoint of a legal 
realist, to claim that the Brandenburg Court ignored empirical evidence about the long-term 
harm of racist ideologies. Tsesis says the Brandenburg “Court failed to evaluate whether 
there were historical reasons to think that a Ku Klux Klan rally might spark racist conflict.” 
TSESIS, supra note 5, at 126. Such a claim simply ignores the historical context of the case. 
The 1969 Brandenburg Court, which included Chief Justice Warren, Justices Douglas, 
Black, Brennan, Fortas (who heard argument but resigned prior to issuance of the opinion), 
and, perhaps most importantly for these purposes, Thurgood Marshall, was probably more 
sympathetic to the rights of “historically oppressed groups” than any other Supreme Court 
in the history of the nation. While the Court did not explicitly “evaluate” Tsesis’s historical 
evidence, it was surely well aware of the “historical reasons to think a Ku Klux Klan rally 
might spark racist conflict” and it was notwithstanding this history, not because the Court 
ignored it, that the test was articulated as it was. Indeed, given the facts of the case, it is 
pretty clear, as Kent Greenawalt has pointed out, that the test in Brandenburg was 
“unnecessary to [the] decision.” Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, supra note 107, at 650. 
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Proponents of a ban on pornography have long argued that there is a 
direct causal connection between pornography and harm to women.120 The 
City of Indianapolis promulgated a ban on pornography justified on 
precisely this ground. When the ordinance was challenged in American 
Booksellers’ Association v. Hudnut,121 the Seventh Circuit invalidated the 
law but took great pains to make clear that it fully accepted the premise that 
pornography caused long-term harm to women. 
Indeed, the Hudnut court’s articulation of the harm that speech can 
cause reads like a page out of Tsesis’s book, in both structure and tone. In 
language that Tsesis would, I am sure, gladly adopt as his own, the Hudnut 
court noted that “[a] belief may be pernicious—the beliefs of Nazis led to 
the death of millions, those of the Klan to the repression of millions. A 
pernicious belief may prevail.”122 Explicitly accepting Tsesis’s view that 
the “marketplace of ideas” will not always result in “truth” and effectively 
adopting Tsesis’s theory of the social psychology of scapegoating, the court 
continued: 
People taught from birth that black people are fit only for slavery 
rarely rebelled against that creed; beliefs coupled with the self-interest 
of the masters established a social structure that inflicted great harm 
while enduring for centuries. Words and images act at the level of the 
subconscious before they persuade at the level of the conscious. Even 
the truth has little chance unless a statement fits within the framework 
of beliefs that may never have been subjected to rational study.123 
Thus, the court had little difficulty accepting the causal connection between 
pornography and harm to women.124 
Nonetheless, the court invalidated the ordinance. The court noted first 
that by itself the causal argument could not be limited to pornography,125 
 
 120. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 46 (1985). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
FREE SPEECH 217-18 (1993); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to 
Women: “No Empirical Evidence?”, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1992); U.S. ATT’Y GEN’S 
COMM’N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 299-351 (1986). 
 121. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), summarily aff’’d, 475 U.S. 1001, reh’’g denied, 475 
U.S. 1132 (1986). A summary affirmance, in contrast to a denial of certiorari, is 
theoretically a decision on the merits. 
 122. Id. at 328. 
 123. Id. at 329. 
 124. Id. (“[W]e accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend 
to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of women in turn leads to affront and 
lower pay at work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the streets.”). 
 125. Id. 
If pornography is what pornography does, so is other speech. Hitler’s orations 
affected how some Germans saw Jews. Communism is a world view, not simply a 
Manifesto by Marx and Engels or a set of speeches. Efforts to suppress communist 
speech in the United States were based on the belief that the public acceptability 
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and second, that, 
Most governments of the world act on this empirical [basis], 
suppressing critical speech.  . . . In the United States, however, . . . the 
strength of the support for this belief is irrelevant. [citing, inter alia, 
Brandenburg] . . . Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, 
reporters’ biases—these and many more influence the culture and 
shape our socialization. None is directly answerable by more speech, 
unless that speech too finds its place in the popular culture. Yet all is 
protected as speech, however insidious. Any other answer leaves the 
government in control of all the institutions of culture, the great 
censor, and director of which thoughts are good for us.126 
In effect, the court is assuming that racist speech causes long-term 
harm. The historical and psychological premises of Tsesis’s book—
whether correct or not—simply confirm what many people, including at 
least one important court,127 already believe. Brandenburg is thus premised 
not on a failure to understand that speech can cause long-term harm but 
 
of such ideas would increase the likelihood of totalitarian government. Religions 
affect socialization in the most pervasive way. . . . Many people believe that the 
existence of television, apart from the content of specific programs, leads to 
intellectual laziness, to a penchant for violence, to many other ills. The Alien and 
Sedition Acts passed during the administration of John Adams rested on a 
sincerely held belief that disrespect for the government leads to social collapse 
and revolution—a belief with support in the history of many nations. 
Id. 
 126. Id. at 329-30 (emphasis added). Much of Tsesis’s critique stems from his view that 
the First Amendment is built solely on a theory that the “marketplace of ideas” will result in 
“truth” in an objective sense. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 130-37. He sees Justice Oliver 
Wendell “Holmes’s legal relativism and skepticism [as] the philosophical vertebrae of his 
‘marketplace of ideas’ doctrine.” Id. at 131. He also rejects Holmes’s “Social Darwinist 
definition of ‘truth.’” Id. at 188. For these reasons, he claims the whole “marketplace of 
ideas” theory should be rejected. See id. at 137 (“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ doctrine is 
based on a relativistic social theory that has imbedded itself into American jurisprudence. Its 
premises support the powerful, even when their aspirations endanger democracy. 
Discrimination and intolerance should not be given the opportunity to win in the power 
market.”). There is a wealth of scholarship on the broad issue of the role of Justice Holmes’s 
philosophical views on his First Amendment jurisprudence. See generally G. Edward White, 
Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human 
Dimension, 80 CAL. L. REV. 391, 393 nn.10, 12 (1992) (listing additional sources for 
reference); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER 
SELF 412-54 (1993). Since White’s 1993 book, the commentary has continued. See, e.g., 
Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (1997). To conclude, as Tsesis does, that we should accept the 
majority opinion in Gitlow, simply because Holmes was a relativist, is to ignore a huge 
debate about the many possible ways in which the “marketplace of ideas” should be viewed. 
As this passage in Hudnut demonstrates, one strand embedded in the imminent-harm 
requirement in Brandenburg makes Holmes’s alleged deference to majoritarian will 
irrelevant. The Hudnut court makes clear that, though the “marketplace” may fail, allowing 
the government to dictate the truth has different risks. 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 121-26 (discussing Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323). 
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instead on the belief that there are “costs” to permitting speech suppression: 
Allowing government to suppress speech because of the potential for long-
term harm can effectively amount to suppressing speech based on 
disagreement with the ideas. What animates the “imminent likelihood of 
harm” requirement, therefore, is the view that government has no place in 
defining the truth, not the view that truth will somehow always prevail.128 
As viewed through the lens of Hudnut, then, Brandenburg can be seen as a 
prophylactic rule to prohibit government from using a long-term harm 
rationale to suppress speech based on the government’s view of truth. 
With Hudnut in mind, let us now look more closely at the two issues I 
raised regarding Tsesis’s theory of Brandenburg: (1) a long-term harm 
rationale cannot be narrowly confined to racist ideologies; and (2) the costs 
of allowing government to dictate the truth to its citizenry must be more 
seriously taken into account, even if objective truth does not arise in the 
absence of government intervention and even if the regulated speech causes 
long-term harm. 
First, Tsesis’s book fails to explain why abandoning Brandenburg for 
racist ideologies based on a long-term harm rationale would not 
fundamentally increase a government’s power to suppress all sorts of other 
speech based on similar grounds.129 If Tsesis’s argument is correct that by 
 
 128. I do not mean to imply that the classic “marketplace of ideas” view that objective 
truth will prevail has been rejected in all circumstances. I am simply claiming that it is not 
what is really animating the Brandenburg rule. 
 129. Cf. GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 90, at 63 (while considering the 
question “close,” noting that one of the problems with arguments based on long-term harm 
is the “difficulty in seeing how the line of permissible restriction is to be drawn once the 
harm of messages becomes the main basis for suppression”). Tsesis does claim, at times, 
that fundamental values of equality embedded in the Equal Protection Clause, or 
“indispensable ethical value in a representative democracy,” might justify special treatment 
for racist speech. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 142, 162. See also id. at 174 (“[H]ate speech . . . is 
incompatible with democracy.”). There is, of course, a huge volume of literature on the 
relationship between the principles of equality and freedom of expression generally and 
between the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause more specifically. Compare, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the 
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992); STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 78-79, n.184 (1999) with, 
e.g., Post, supra note 11, at 314-17. See also Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: 
Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95. 
Moreover, while much of this literature also includes the claim that racist speech differs 
from other types of speech because racist speech undermines fundamental values, the same 
claim could certainly be made about flag burning. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421, 
429 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The American flag . . . has come to be the visible 
symbol embodying our Nation. . . . [It] is not simply another ‘idea’ or ‘point of view’ 
competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas.”). See generally Post, supra note 11, 
at 315-16. In any event, this argument is precisely the line of reasoning upon which those 
who have sought to ban speech have always relied. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in 
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itself, any causal connection between speech and harm, no matter how 
remote, is sufficient to permit the government to suppress speech, then all 
the advocacy/incitement cases the Court decided before Brandenburg were 
correctly decided and the Alien and Sedition Acts would be 
constitutional.130 Teaching Marxism could be proscribed,131 and the 
government could jail those who oppose a war the government supports.132 
Ultimately, giving government the power to suppress speech on as loose a 
causal connection as Tsesis suggests—to give government the power to  
 
 
New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 
366-72 (1995) (noting that “in every age the leading proponents of various bans on certain 
ideas have insisted that the First Amendment does not fully protect the right to deny or 
criticize what their generation regards to be fundamental constitutional values”). As a 
question of doctrine, moreover, “courts have consistently held that within public discourse 
the antidiscrimination norm of equality should be subordinated to the value of democratic 
autonomy.” Robert C. Post, Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment, in DIRECTIONS IN 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., forthcoming 
2003). See also GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 90, at 61 (“[T]he courts have 
not been receptive to the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes restriction of 
speech that would otherwise fall within a protected category.”). In any event, suffice it to 
say that Tsesis adds nothing original to these debates. Moreover, because of the breadth of 
speech that Tsesis would criminalize, the balance in the debate would shift markedly in 
favor of freedom of expression and even many of those who have argued for limitations on 
expression based on an equality rationale would not be willing to accept his broad proposed 
statute. For purposes of this Review, however, I need not enter this debate since Tsesis’s 
thesis focuses on the long-term harm caused by the speech. 
 130. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (noting that it is now 
commonly believed that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional). 
 131. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). One point of note: Tsesis may well 
be consistent here. He appears to view Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), as rightly 
decided. Tsesis approvingly quotes the Gitlow majority: 
It cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when, in the 
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace 
and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled 
the flame or blazed into the conflagration. 
TSESIS, supra note 5, at 139; see also id. at 124 (“The Gitlow majority . . . clearly 
recognized the potentially long-term inflammatory effects of speech and understood the 
dangers of not immediately curbing instigative words.”). Gitlow involved a prosecution of a 
“member of the Left-Wing Section of the Socialist Party” solely for printing and distributing 
the “Left Wing Manifesto.” Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 655. The conviction was upheld 
notwithstanding the fact that “[t]here was no evidence of any effect resulting from the 
publication and circulation of the Manifesto.” Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 656.  If Tsesis does regard 
Gitlow as rightly decided and would take his argument to its logical conclusion, he is at least 
consistent and has not fallen victim to what Robert Post has called “the fallacy of 
immaculate isolation”—that is, the idea that one can characterize the impact of banning 
particular speech as de minimis and consider the harm to First Amendment values minimal. 
See Post, supra note 11, at 315-16. Of course, this would mean instead that Tsesis is willing 
to effectively rewrite modern First Amendment doctrine for all sorts of speech. 
 132. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919). See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
DESAIFINAL 4/3/2003  2:00 PM 
Number 2] HARM OF BIASED SPEECH 387 
censor Luther to prevent Hitler—is little different from giving government 
the power to declare certain ideas to be wrong. 
As I noted above, this may be Tsesis’s ultimate goal—to have 
government declare that any expression of racial and ethnic inequality is 
simply a “false characterization[].”133 If so, then it is not difficult to see 
why courts in the United States would be reluctant to accept Tsesis’s 
argument, even if his history were flawless. Once the question is whether 
government may suppress an idea simply because the idea is wrong, 
Tsesis’s thesis runs into grave difficulties in the United States. As Justice 
Brennan put it, “[t]he First Amendment does not guarantee that . . . 
concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole—such as the principle 
that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive—will go 
unquestioned.”134 
The second issue is far trickier and requires consideration of 
competing values: the potential long-term harm of speech and the potential 
harm of government censorship. Certainly, one can argue that the Hudnut 
court’s approach of assuming the harm caused by pornography while 
ignoring it altogether in the constitutional calculus seems incomplete, even 
if it has a certain logical appeal. Indeed, as Frank Michelman has pointed 
out, Hudnut seems troublesome because the court effectively elevated the 
view that government censorship is bad to an irrebuttable precept, such that 
no countervailing harm can matter.135 If one could in fact suppress the 
relevant speech to prevent a future Holocaust and there were no other 
 
 133. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 200; see supra note 94 and text accompanying notes 92-94. 
 134. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989). In Johnson, the Court invalidated a 
flag-desecration statute. In a case about flag burning, Justice Brennan’s dictum can only be 
seen as specifically aimed at those who argue for a ban on expressions of racist ideology. 
See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 121 (referring to this specific quotation and noting that 
“Brennan seemed to go out of his way to make sure that no one could mistake his position 
on the constitutionality of hate speech regulation”). Of course, this is hardly the only time 
the Court has articulated the view that preventing government suppression of ideas because 
of disagreement with those ideas is one of the foundations of the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972): 
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content. To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure 
self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express 
any thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden 
censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its 
content would completely undercut the “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open.” 
Id. at 95-96 (internal citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964)). 
 135. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989). 
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means of preventing such a calamity, it seems unsatisfying to respond with 
the Hudnut court’s admonition about government as “the great censor.” A 
little censorship does not sound all that bad if the only other option is the 
systematic slaughter of six million people. 
Moreover, one can certainly disagree with the Hudnut court as to how 
much faith to place in government’s ability wisely to exercise the power to 
proscribe speech that can cause long-term harm, and there is little doubt 
that Tsesis, like much of the rest of the world,136 implicitly does. It could 
be that the view that government cannot be trusted with the power to 
suppress speech based on either the potential for long-term harm or because 
certain ideas are themselves so reprehensible as to be fundamentally at 
odds with a democratic state is simply an ideological position grounded in 
an impressionistic assessment of history rather than in an empirical 
conclusion about the actual role of government in suppressing speech. 
Though I am inclined to disagree with that claim, I am not enough of an 
historian of censorship to know for sure. 
But if Tsesis wants to convince Americans to abandon Brandenburg 
in favor of a regime that has the power to suppress biased speech, he needs 
to do more than say biased speech leads to long-term harm. He needs at 
least to acknowledge and address the fact that laws are enforced by 
government officials, human beings who can—and, throughout history, 
have—abused the power he wishes to confer upon them.137 
In fact, what is perhaps most troubling about Tsesis’s thesis is the 
inherent paradox of his claim that a criminal statute, one that would place 
prosecutorial discretion in a government official, would alleviate the harms 
he describes when each one of the historical examples he gives (the 
Holocaust, American slavery, and the expulsion of indigenous Americans 
from their land) involves oppression committed by governments. Others 
have discussed at length the fact that, rather than protecting those Tsesis 
refers to as “outgroups,” regimes of hate-speech regulation138 have been 
disproportionately used to suppress the speech of such groups.139 For 
 
 136. Cf. Brugger, supra note 90, at 14 (“[U]nlike Germans, Americans do not trust 
government to select ‘good’ over ‘bad’ opinions—a consequence of this attitude is that 
viewpoint discrimination by representatives of the government, even if directed at ‘evil 
speech,’ is viewed with suspicion . . . .”). 
 137. Even as unswerving a proponent of hate speech regulation as Mari Matsuda has 
explicitly acknowledged that her proposal (a narrower proposal aimed at face-to-face 
epithets) “goes against the long-standing and healthy American distrust of government 
power.”  Matsuda, supra note 11, at 2322. 
 138. Here I use “hate speech” in the more common sense of that phrase, but I doubt the 
point loses its force when applied to Tsesis’s even broader definition. 
 139. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 21, at 43-46; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech 
on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 556-59. 
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example, the first prosecution under Canada’s anti-pornography law was 
against a homosexual bookstore, and “copies of a book widely assigned in 
women’s studies courses, Black Looks: Race and Representation by the 
well-known black feminist scholar bell hooks, [were] confiscated by 
Canadian authorities as possible ‘hate literature.’”140 The University of 
Michigan’s campus “hate speech” code141 likewise produced an unenviable 
record for minorities: whites charged more than twenty blacks with racist 
speech; the two times that punishment was meted out for racist speech both 
involved black students; and the only student subjected to a full-fledged 
disciplinary hearing under the policy was a black student who claimed he 
was “singled out because of his race and his political views.”142 Of course, 
these are only examples, but however widespread problems of this sort 
might be, the criticism of “hate speech” laws on this basis becomes even 
stronger when viewed in light of Tsesis’s thesis, that censoring racist 
ideologies is justified because expression of those views has historically led 
to government-sanctioned oppression like the Holocaust. 
Interestingly enough, at one point Tsesis even argues that many 
contemporary politicians are connected with white supremacists. In 
particular, he criticizes several government officials, including Mississippi 
Governor Kirk Fordice and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, for their 
relationship with the Council of Conservative Citizens, a group that 
espouses white separatist views.143 And yet it is these executive branch 
officials who, under Tsesis’s proposal, would have the ultimate 
prosecutorial discretion to initiate charges. It is they who will decide, in the 
first instance, what constitutes a “historically persecuted group” (in the 
language of Tsesis’s proposed statute) and what sort of actions are likely to 
“incit[e] others to discriminate, persecute, oppress, or commit any similar 
acts.”144 If Tsesis believes they are racists, this fact alone should be enough 
to give him pause. 
Indeed, one more example might best illustrate what strikes me as the 
paradox of Tsesis’s thesis. Recall that one historical example Tsesis uses to 
support his argument for abandoning Brandenburg was the claim that 
expressions of racist ideology led to slavery. Of course, Brandenburg was 
not the law in the antebellum period, and so presumably, Tsesis’s proposed 
statute outlawing biased speech could have been constitutional then, at least 
 
 140. See Gates, supra note 21, at 43. 
 141. See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (invalidating the 
code). 
 142. Strossen, supra note 139, at 557-58 (citation omitted). 
 143. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 76-77. 
 144. Id. at 207. 
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without the constraint of an “imminent harm” requirement. But what did in 
fact happen in the absence of Brandenburg? During the 1830s, a slew of 
Southern legislatures passed laws aimed at suppressing abolitionist speech. 
Why? Because the abolitionists’ ideas could bring about violence—that is, 
slave rebellions—and even threaten the survival of the Union.145 Using the 
standard of deterministic causation that Tsesis uses in the historical section 
of his book, history obviously proved them correct. The abolitionists’ 
speech (slaveholders no doubt could have characterized it at the time as 
“hate speech”) certainly “pave[d] the way” for slave rebellions and, of 
course, the Civil War.146 And yet, in a regime without some kind of 
imminent harm requirement such as to be found in Brandenburg (and 
without some form of First Amendment incorporation or a state 
constitutional provision similar to the First Amendment), those laws 
presumably would be constitutional. 
B. The Need for Precision in Drafting a Criminal Prohibition on 
Biased Speech 
Finally, let me return to Tsesis’s proposed criminal statute because it 
is in the specific context of his actual proposal that we can begin to 
evaluate the worry that permitting a loose connection between speech and 
action amounts to allowing government to censor unpopular ideas. 
As I noted earlier, Tsesis advocates giving government the power to 
imprison 
(1) [a]nyone inciting others to discriminate, persecute, oppress, or 
commit any similar acts against members of a historically persecuted 
group;147 (2) where it is substantially probable or reasonably 
 
 145. “[B]y 1835 the assumption that abolitionist publications would lead to slave 
rebellions seemed so obvious to many Northerners and Southerners that it needed no 
demonstration.” Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress 
Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 802 (1995). 
 146. See generally id. at 802-04. There are, of course, normative reasons why we might 
want to “blame” racist speech, rather than abolitionist speech, for the Civil War. My point is 
simply that a long-term harm rationale permits government to suppress both “good” and 
“bad” speech. 
 147. One thing to note about this language is that the statute does not even require that 
the “discrimination,” “persecution,” etc. be based on race or ethnicity; it merely requires 
that the discrimination be against a member of a historically persecuted group, and thus all 
that is necessary is that the potential victim of the incitement be a member of a historically 
persecuted group. If read literally then, Tsesis’s incitement standard (putting aside for a 
moment the third prong of the statute—the “intent . . . to promote destructive behavior” 
language) would apply to any situation in which a member of a historically persecuted 
group is in the category of those being discriminated against, irrespective of whether the 
categorization was based on race or ethnicity. Advocacy for lower bus fares for children 
could thus be covered by his incitement standard simply because some adults are black. 
That the categorization is based on age is irrelevant as long as a member of a “historically 
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foreseeable, based on the content and context of the message, that its 
dissemination will elicit such acts; and (3) where the speaker intended 
the message to promote destructive behavior.148 
He then provides for an affirmative defense if “the statement was uttered as 
an expression of opinion on a neutral scientific, academic, or religious 
subject and/or the statement was made to eliminate the incidence of hatred 
toward a historically persecuted group.”149 
I would like to focus on a few aspects of the statute’s language. First, 
notice that the proposed statute prohibits “incit[ement] . . . to discriminate.” 
As I explain presently, this language is extremely broad. Second, notice the 
language requiring that the speaker intend “to promote destructive 
behavior.” This is problematic for a couple of reasons I discuss below. 
Third, notice that there is no defense for expressions of opinion on matters 
of policy. I am not sure whether this is intentional, but given that a large 
amount of the speech Tsesis describes in the first half of the book involves 
policy debates, it may well be. This likewise is a significant problem. 
If we look at a few hypotheticals, we can see the problems that could 
arise. In 1990, there was a controversy about whether Shoal Creek Golf 
Club, home of that year’s Professional Golf Association (“PGA”) 
Championships, would admit blacks. The question arose because the club, 
like most golf clubs that host PGA tour events, is private and thus claimed, 
under principles of the constitutional right of association, the right to 
exclude anyone it wanted on any basis whatsoever, including on the basis 
of race. When the PGA changed its rules to require clubs that hosted PGA 
tour events to integrate, many of the segregated clubs changed their rules 
while others continued their discriminatory policies and simply stopped 
hosting tournaments.150 Or consider another example: As is well known in 
the wake of the “don’t-ask, don’t-tell” controversy, the Department of 
Defense excludes homosexuals from military service.151 Both the 
segregated golf club and the military have policies that could easily be 
characterized as “discriminat[ory]” towards “members of a historically 
persecuted group,”152 notwithstanding the fact that both types of 
discrimination are sanctioned by positive law in the United States. 
 
persecuted group” is somehow being discriminated against. This is probably just a drafting 
error, which presumably could be fixed by adding language to the effect of “because of their 
status as members of a historically persecuted group” to the end of the first prong of the 
proposed statute. 
 148. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 207. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Jaime Diaz, In Golf, Integration Is More Than 9-Iron Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
1991, at C1. 
 151. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). 
 152. See supra text accompanying note 148 (quoting TSESIS, supra note 5, at 207). 
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Consider someone who is one step removed from the policy. Rather 
than actually implementing one of these perfectly legal policies, this person 
simply advocates in favor of the golf club or the military policy by writing 
an op-ed piece or giving a public speech. Let us assume also that she does 
so convincingly enough to persuade those with the power to do so to 
maintain the discriminatory policy. This sort of advocacy would constitute 
(1) inciting others to discriminate (2) where it is likely that the statements 
“will elicit [the discriminatory] acts.” 
The only difficult issue appears to be whether implementation of the 
underlying discriminatory policies constitutes “destructive behavior” that 
the speaker “intends to promote.” As I noted earlier,153 there is no 
definition of the phrase “destructive behavior,” which by itself raises 
vagueness problems. Is “destructive behavior” the same as “discriminate, 
persecute, oppress, or commit any similar acts”? Is it a subset? Or are these 
two completely distinct categories? If “destructive behavior” is not simply 
a shorthand way of saying “discriminate, persecute, oppress, or commit any 
similar acts,” this is a somewhat odd statutory requirement because there 
would be a mismatch between the first prong of the statute—the actual acts 
the defendant must incite in order to be found guilty—and the third 
prong—what the defendant must intend. Be that as it may, let us assume 
that the phrase “destructive behavior” is meant to be something different 
from “discriminate, persecute, oppress, or commit any similar acts.” Even 
if we make this assumption, however, the phrase might still permit a broad 
application of the statute. Note, for example, that one meaning of the word 
“destroy” is to “ruin (someone) emotionally or spiritually.”154 Without any 
further definitional clarity, it is thus at least plausible to argue that 
involuntary discharge from the Navy is “destructive,” since it results in the 
loss of one’s livelihood and, for some members of the military, their very 
community.155 While it might be a closer question in the case of exclusion 
from a golf club, there is likely evidence that being segregated from 
important athletic and social opportunities destroys the psyche of those 
being excluded—that is, the segregation of golf clubs “ruin[s] [those 
excluded] emotionally or spiritually.” In short, Tsesis’s proposal allows for 
the possibility that advocating in favor of one side of an important public 
debate could be viewed as illegal. 
Admittedly, these examples stretch the meaning of the phrase 
“destructive behavior.” This is presumably not what Tsesis had in mind, 
and one might be able to clarify this with more precise language. But, 
 
 153. See supra note 43. 
 154. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 464 (2001). 
 155. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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consider another area of law where “discrimination” on the basis of race 
and ethnicity has been rampant throughout U.S. history: immigration 
policy. The Attorney General recently issued an order requiring adult male 
noncitizens over the age of sixteen who come from twenty-one different 
countries, primarily Arab and Muslim, to be interviewed, photographed, 
and fingerprinted.156 Let us take it one step further and imagine a proposal 
to revoke the immigration status of, and deport, every noncitizen from 
those countries. There is little doubt that such a policy would be 
discriminatory, and yet Congress might be able to pass such a law under its 
plenary powers over immigration;157 however, under Tsesis’s proposal, 
advocating in favor of it might be criminalized since such advocacy would 
be “inciting others to discriminate” with the intent to “promote destructive 
behavior.” I suspect this is likely to be much closer to what Tsesis means 
when he uses the phrase “destructive behavior.” After all, one of the 
historical examples he gives is the expulsion of indigenous Americans from 
their land in the nineteenth century, and expulsion from the United States 
on the basis of one’s national origin is at least somewhat analogous. 
One response to all of these examples is that the word “discriminate” 
would cover only “illegal discrimination” so that one could advocate for 
“legal” discrimination. The term “incite” certainly retains connotations of 
abetting a crime.158 With the immigration example, one could perhaps 
argue that foreigners cannot be members of a “historically persecuted 
group,”159 or that Congress’s powers over either the military or 
immigration are sui generis. But, it would be hard to square this sort of a 
 
 156. See John M. Broder and Susan Sachs, Facing Registry Deadline, Men From Muslim 
Nations Swamp Immigration Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/politics/17IMMI.html. The countries are Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, 
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. Id. 
 157. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (“Chinese Exclusion Case”), 130 U.S. 581 
(1889). Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 158. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (7th ed. 1999). Cf. TSESIS, supra note 5, at 203 
(including among the considerations to be taken into account when regulating biased speech 
“[w]hether the [s]peaker [i]ntended the [d]eclarations to [i]ncite [c]riminal [a]cts against an 
[o]utgroup” (emphasis added)). 
 159. As Henry Louis Gates has explained, phrases such as “historically persecuted 
group” also are open to definitional problems. See Gates, supra note 21, at 33. Gates asked 
whether poor Appalachians are “historically oppressed” and then noted: 
Once we had adopted the “historically oppressed” proviso, I suspect it would just 
be a matter of time before a group of black women in Chicago are arraigned for 
calling a policeman a “dumb Polack.” Evidence that Poles are a historically 
oppressed group in Chicago will be in plentiful supply. 
Id. 
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positivist spin on the word “discriminate” when the thrust of Tsesis’s book 
is that advocacy in favor of slavery or the policy of native American 
dislocation should have been outlawed as “hate speech” notwithstanding 
the fact that the underlying discriminatory acts were clearly legal at the 
time. In any event, such a response would simply beg the question of what 
sort of “discrimination” should be legal, a question the First Amendment 
properly leaves the citizenry to debate without fear of prosecution. 
In short, the practical problems of drafting a statute that avoids 
serious vagueness and overbreadth160 problems cannot be underestimated. 
It may be that Eleanor Holmes Norton was overstating it when she said, “It 
is technically impossible to write an anti-speech code that cannot be twisted 
against speech nobody means to bar.”161 But Tsesis’s proposal does little to 
convince me that she was wrong. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, although Tsesis’s “goal of preventing atrocities against racial 
and ethnic minorities is laudable, he has not sufficiently supported his view 
that a criminal law banning what he refers to as “hate speech” would 
further that goal. Indeed, because he has not adequately considered the 
potential for government abuse that his proposal invites, his proposed law 
could very well do more harm than good. 
In effect, what Tsesis’s book depends on is hope, the hope that if a 
society declares “hate speech” to be illegal, it can eliminate “hate speech” 
and it can thereby eliminate hatred itself. One is led to presume this will 
end inequality based on differences of race, ethnicity, culture, and the like, 
and that genocide, institutionalized subjugation, and oppression will all 
vanish into thin air. One can only imagine what the world would be like if 
it were so simple. 
 
 
 160. Again, I use the term “overbreadth” in its lay, rather than doctrinal, sense. 
 161. Strossen, supra note 139, at 486. See also Michael W. McConnell, America’s First 
“Hate Speech” Regulation, 9 CONST. COMM. 17, 23 (1992) (while expressing tentative 
support for regulation of invective or epithets based on the rationale that such speech can 
silence its intended audience, noting that “we should also be aware that there are grave, and 
perhaps insuperable, difficulties in drafting regulations that are broad enough without being 
vague”). 
